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Abstract
The Internet network has received huge attentions by the research com-
munity. At a first glance, the network optimization and scalability issues
dominate the efforts of researchers and vendors. Many results have been
obtained in the last decades: the Internet’s architecture is optimized to be
cheap, robust and ubiquitous. In contrast, such a network has never been
perfectly secure. During all its evolution, the security threats of the Inter-
net persist as a transversal and endless topic.
Nowadays, the Internet network hosts a multitude of mission critical
activities. The electronic voting systems and financial services are carried
out through it. Governmental institutions, financial and business organi-
zations depend on the performance and the security of the Internet. This
role confers to the Internet network a critical characterization. At the same
time, the Internet network is a vector of malicious activities, like Denial
of Service attacks; many reports of attacks can be found in both academic
outcomes and daily news.
In order to mitigate this wide range of issues, many research efforts
have been carried out in the past decades; unfortunately, the complex ar-
chitecture and the scale of the Internet make hard the evaluation and the
adoption of such proposals.
In order to improve the security of the Internet, the research commu-
nity can benefit from sharing real network data. Unfortunately, privacy
and security concerns inhibit the release of these data: its suffices to imag-
ine the big amount of private information (e.g., political preferences or
religious belief) it is possible to get while reading the Internet packets ex-
changed between users and web services.
v
This scenario motivates my research, and represents the context of this
dissertation which contributes to the analysis of the security issues of the
Internet infrastructures and describes relevant security proposals.
In particular, the main outcomes described in this dissertation are:
• the definition of a secure routing protocol for the Internet network
able to provide cryptographic guarantees against false route announce-
ment and invalid path attack;
• the definition of a new obfuscation technique that allow the research
community to publicly release their real network flows with formal
guarantees of security and privacy;
• the evidence of a new kind of leakage of sensitive informations ob-
tained hacking the models used by sundry Machine Learning Algo-
rithms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Internet as critical infrastructure
Over the last decades, the Internet has grown to become a pivot of our
society. Thanks to the huge number of "connected" users, Internet is a
useful and easy vector able to offer services globally. Internet represents
a large media where communications and information pass through and
reach the entire world. With the large spread of the mobile devices (e.g.,
smarthphone, tablets and others), Internet assumes a key role in the com-
munication pattern; the ability of stay connected every-where every-when
cannot be satisfied without the technological support of such a network.
This aspect gives Internet a primary role in our community. Nowa-
days, Internet is the mean for providing a multitude of critical services:
example of this is the banking services where users perform economi-
cal transactions just clicking on a web page, hedge fund systems or the
electronic voting systems which enable the users to express their political
preferences. At the same time, Governmental Institutions, financial and
business organizations strictly depend on the performance and security of
Internet. This aspect in conjunction with the economical and social rel-
evance of the above mentioned services, confers to the Internet a critical
characterization.
Internet can be seen as a graph where the nodes are the Autonomous
1
2Systems (in this thesis referred as AS) and an edge represents the connec-
tion between two AS nodes. The Autonomous Systems are uniquely iden-
tified by a the AS number and are organized in a hierarchical (multi-tier)
fashion. Each AS node manages a collection of connected Internet Protocol
(IP) network prefixes. The network prefixes as well as the AS numbers are
allocated by a Regional Internet Registry (RIR). Globally, Internet numbers
are managed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), an or-
ganization operated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN).
Today, Internet is composed by∼400.000 IP prefixes managed by about
40.000 AS nodes. Each AS exchanges raw data (traffic packets) and rout-
ing information with other AS nodes. The routing information are all the
data needed by the routers to make the right decisions on how to forward
the packets. The connection between Autonomous Systems is named Peer-
ing Agreement: a voluntary interconnection among AS nodes for the pur-
pose of exchanging traffic between the customers of their network pre-
fixes. This interconnections are usually driven by political and economic
agreements. A Peering agreement may occur inside an Internet eXchange
Point (IXP), namely the physical infrastructure through which Autono-
mous Systems exchange Internet traffic between their networks. In the In-
ternet architecture, an IXP introduces two benefits: i) it reduces the traffic
of a network which must be delivered via upstream providers decreasing
the cost of their service, ii) improves routing efficiency and fault-tolerance
of the Internet.
The security of the Internet infrastructure is constantly threatened by
cyber attacks. In fact, in the last years, new viruses and cyber weapons
have been introduced to violate the national infrastructure. Stuxnet, [148],
and Flame, [78], are examples of such cyber attacks.
One of the well known cyber attacks to the Internet infrastructure is
the Youtube hijack, reported by Ripe NCC in [127], [105] and by the BBC
in [6]. On Sunday, 24 February 2008, the Pakistan Telecom (uniquely iden-
tified by the AS number AS17557) started the announcement of a sub-
prefix of the Youtube’s networks. Youtube’s upstream provider by just
3forwarded the announcement without verifying its validity, which caused
a global-scale hijacking of traffic related to YouTube into the Pakistan Tele-
com autonomous system. Although this event happened in a short time
interval, the YouTube’s networks returned to be available after about two
hours. In the same fashion, in 2010, one of the Data Centers operated by
China Telecom announced about 37,000 unique network prefixes as re-
ported in [46]: for a period of 18 minutes the China Telecom Hijacked 15%
of the world’s Web traffic to servers in China. Further details can be found
in [8] and [5]. The report in [46] claims that the incident affected the traffic
to and from U.S. government and military web domains (.gov and .mil),
including those of the US Senate, the US Army, the US navy, the US Marine
Corps, the US Air Force.
Many other examples of cyber attacks can be found in the history of
the Internet. In front of this kind of events the research community is
discussing the feasibility of making Internet more secure.
These examples show that the security of the services reachable through
the Internet is based on the security of the Internet infrastructures.
Most of the security issues of the Internet infrastructure are related to
the Internet routing protocol, namely the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
defined in the RFC 4271, [126]. BGP is a path vector protocol that allows
the Internet routers to exchange routing informations; currently, the Inter-
net routing implements the version 4 of the protocol [125], proposed in
1995. The lack of security mechanisms exposes the BGP protocol to a wide
range of threats that are constantly undermining security of the Internet.
The security of the BGP protocol has become a critical goal of the In-
ternet management community, since every (erroneous or malicious) mis-
configuration of a participating router can lead to severe attacks, e.g. the
network disruptions or traffic hijacking [98, 3]. As BGP has been designed
with no security features, there are many examples of how easily BGP al-
terations had a negative impact on the normal Internet traffic such as the
China hijack described above. BGP vulnerabilities are due to the lack of
a scalable means to verify the authenticity and legitimacy of BGP control
traffic. The lacks of security in the BGP protocol has been highlighted
4early after its widespread deployment, since no cryptographic authenti-
cation of the communications is considered. Announced routes are not
verified but rather directly propagated. The lack of security mechanisms
leads to forged route announcement propagation, which is probably the
major weakness of the BGP protocol.
The security concerns of the Internet network are largely transposed
into the research communities. In the last decade, a huge amount of papers
and surveys have been written, [143, 19, 73, 154, 16, 67, 149, 147, 110, 154].
A number of cryptographic solutions to prevent BGP attacks have been
proposed, [73, 147, 110], but they have not been adopted due to involved
operations and considerable overheads. Many studies on the adoption of
these solutions have been also provided [74, 138].
The earliest solution to BGP security (i.e., S-BGP [73]) involves digi-
tal signature schemes, where AS nodes sign their announcements that can
later be verified by other peers. However, digital signatures require a Pub-
lic Key Infrastructure (PKI) to issue and deliver public key certificates. S-
BGP has fostered a number of research efforts to secure BGP [15, 73, 154].
Nevertheless, involved operations, complex trust relations and the diffi-
culty to set up and manage a global PKI hinder the real-world deployment
of any security means designed for BGP.
Furthermore, it seems that no secure version of BGP has efficiently ad-
dressed the problem of both route and prefix revocation. With current PKI-
based solutions, once an AS has been authorized to forward an IP prefix,
there is no means to securely revoke the authorization. In particular, it is
possible to revoke the AS certificate so that all its announcements become
invalid. However, no proposal provides fine-grained revocation of single
announcements.
Observation 1 The Internet cyber security depends on the security of the under-
lying routing protocol. The Border Gateway Protocol, namely the state of the art
of the Internet Routing Protocol, does not provide suitable security guarantees.
The distributed nature of the Internet makes research activities a great
5challenge, at the same time, the Internet scale makes it hard to apply solu-
tions, evaluates algorithms and proposals.
In order to evaluate the application of new Internet protocols, the re-
search communities can get benefit by the sharing of real network data
collected by the nodes of the network. In fact, each AS node of Internet
maintains a limited and isolated point of view of the entire network. It
seems that the amount of data that cross these nodes does not suffice to
build a complete and coherent view of the entire Internet Infrastructure.
It sounds like the old Indian story of John Godfrey Saxe titled “The blind
men and an elephant”, [130].
Examples of real data to be shared include network traffic, routing ta-
bles and network topology as also stated in [21]. In details, the authors
of [21] provide a model for evaluating the adaptability of a secure BGP
routing protocol by an ISP point of view; the model uses the exchanged
traffic and the Internet topology (in terms of weighted AS-level graph) as
parameter to define the Adaptability value of a secure BGP protocol.
Furthermore, real network data are a very valuable resource for re-
searchers; for instance, to model the network behavior, to experiment new
protocols, and to study many cyber security attacks.
Observation 2 The sharing of real network data provides a great benefit for the
study and the evaluation of new network research proposals.
Unfortunately, getting accurate details on real AS traffic is impractical
since this kind of data are usually confidential, or may contain private in-
formations: security and privacy concerns discourage the publication of
such data sets. Mainly, the concerns related with the release of real net-
work data are two: by point of view of the data owner, shared information
may reveal sensitive details exploitable by malicious users; on the other
hand, there exist legal questions about the users privacy.
Consider a real data set of network flows of Internet traffic, namely the
list of connections exchanged between two AS nodes. Based on network
flows about the Web sites visited by a given individual, an adversary may
infer sensitive data, such as political preferences, religious belief, health
6status, and more. At the same time, network flows may reveal personal
communications among specific individuals, such as the existence of email
exchanges, and chat sessions among them. Moreover, network flows can
be exploited by adversaries to gather useful informations in planning net-
work attacks, for instance, for identifying possible bottlenecks in the target
network in order to increase the impact of Denial of Service attacks.
As a consequence, various research efforts have been carried on to pro-
tect privacy of real network data while preserving the practical interest in
using the released network flows. Early techniques were based on the sub-
stitution of the real IP addresses with pseudo-IDs, for instance in Crypto-
PAn [52]. However, it has been shown that this technique is insufficient,
since an adversary may reconstruct the real IPs based on the values of
other fields of the flows [76], exploiting his knowledge of the characteris-
tics of network hosts (fingerprinting attacks), or by injecting peculiar flows
in the monitored network (injection attacks). For this reason, more sophis-
ticated techniques have been proposed, based on the perturbation of other
data in the flows, e.g., [14, 115, 134, 54]. However, it seems that the tech-
niques proposed do not provide any formal guarantee of protections, and
it has been recently shown that they are prone to different kinds of at-
tacks [18].
In addition consider the topology of Internet, namely the physical and
logical interconnection between AS nodes (usually named “peering agree-
ments”). These agreements are usually driven by political and economic
agreements, hence, they are confidentials and reserved since them can be
maliciously exploited by a competitors.
Furthermore, the sharing of real network data can also bring benefits
to other research fields. The Denial of Service attack detection is another
relevant research field which can get benefit of the sharing of real net-
work data. The Denial of Service attacks is one of the most effective ma-
licious activities achievable in a network. In the last years, thousand of
Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) have been registered against
Governmental Institutions and companies [84, 124]. The insight behind
these attacks is quite simple: the high number of connections, or high
7rate of session-work required by the adversary, fill the resources (e.g stor-
age, bandwidth or CPU) of the targeted appliance. Automatic tools, freely
available in the Internet, help attacker in performing these malicious ac-
tions. Such easy-to-use interface makes these activities exploitable by all
Internet users: political activists (aka “hacktivists”), individuals or groups
of interest keep increasing the use of these tools to express their own dis-
agreement against private companies or political initiative (i.e., websites
of Public Administrations, mail servers etc.). The Cisco security annual
report, [28], documents this.
Many network administration tools, such as DoS detection algorithms
and Traffic Classifiers, can be improved if companies, Institutions and re-
searchers could share the real data with a high degree of security, privacy
and precision. Even if the sharing of network data can help the research
communities, it’s important to notice how the lack of such sharing can
cause unexpected results.
In fact, many traffic classification engine, as well as DoS detection al-
gorithms, have been proposed in the past, [99, 48, 49, 7, 106, 50, 2, 152];
each of them proposes new techniques, implements different algorithms
and performs good results. Usually, the motivation for such results is
twofold: i) the researcher performs algorithms evaluations using synthetic
data, namely, traffic logs artificially generated or ii) the training data sets
used to evaluate algorithms are not so representative. Consider the De-
nial of Service Detection algorithms, the literature abounds of conflicting
proposals. Many papers propose the use of sundry metrics borrowed by
the Information Theory field, [85, 132, 86, 87, 129], as the best solution,
at the same time, other results claim that statistical approaches work bet-
ter, [150, 37, 53, 112, 136]. Equally, similar considerations can be done for
Intrusion Detection Systems [22, 113, 75, 103, 26, 114].
The relevance of shared real network data is also documented by the
huge amount of research and paper that survey the anonimization and
privacy issues, or by the number of projects which involve the use of real
data. The DARPA Intrusion Detection Data Sets 1 provided by the Lincoln
1http://www.ll.mit.edu/
8Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a valid example of
this phenomenon. The Lincoln Laboratory published dataset of real net-
work data in which several attacks have been recorder. These data sets
were largely used by the research community as support of Intrusion De-
tection Systems.
Observation 3 The security and privacy concerns inhibit the release of real net-
work data. No previous proposal of network data anonymization provides formal
guarantee about security and privacy.
Note that, the real network data can be released in a direct or indirect
fashion. The privacy and security concerns are not only related to the
real network data directly released. For example, real network data can
be “synthesized” in mathematical models, used by the Machine Learning
Algorithms. Usually, the Machine Learning (ML) systems are trained to
perform a variety of complex tasks. Machine Learning systems learn how
to recognize patterns (training phase), make unexpected decisions, or re-
act to a dynamic environment (classification phase). During the learning
phase, the relationships and the correlations implied in the training sam-
ples (e.g., real network data) are gathered inside the model. Afterwards, the
model is used during the classification phase to classify and evaluate new
data. These trained models may leak sensitive information as discussed in
chapter 6.
The models used in Machine Learning algorithms are also subject of many
privacy and security attacks. In the lasts years, two techniques have been
developed to mitigate these issues: the Privacy Preserving Data Mining,
[142], and the Differential Privacy, [44]. The Privacy Preserving Data min-
ing is a prolific research area in which many techniques able to preserve
the privacy of the single records are proposed. On the other hand, in 2004,
Cynthia Dwork proposed Differential Privacy, namely a technique able to
maximize the accuracy of queries from statistical databases while mini-
mizing the identification of its records.
The Machine Learning algorithms are largely used for many network-
ing operations, [48, 49, 7, 77, 106, 17], security tasks, [116, 131, 75, 104, 103,
966, 26, 114], medical activities, [146, 97, 135, 88, 63] and more [70, 140].
The outcomes of my research focus on the issues described in this sce-
nario and contribute in several aspects of the cyber security issues of the
Internet Infrastructure.
1.1.1 Research questions
There are many security aspects that require a deep analysis and more
efforts by researchers and vendors. In particular, this dissertation ad-
dresses the following research questions:
Question 1 How can the Internet community get a secure Internet Routing pro-
tocol? Can this solution be easily applicable on the Internet?
Question 2 How can a network administrator detect a Denial of Service attacks?
Are the most used metrics really reliable?
Question 3 Can companies, Institutions and research communities safely share
the real network data of their network while preserving the security of their net-
work and the privacy of their users?
Question 4 Can companies, Institutions and research communities safely share
a Machine Learning Classifier with others, without any leakage of sensitive infor-
mations? For example, can Institutions and research communities safely share a
DoS detection system or a Internet Traffic Classifier learned with the real network
data of their network?
1.1.2 Contributions
The outcomes proposed in this dissertation, provide the following con-
tributions:
Contribution 1 (Internet Routing Security [94]) Lack of security mech-
anisms expose the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) to a wide range of
threats that are constantly undermining security of the Internet. Chapter 3
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introduces the protocol reBGP, [94], a secure BGP protocol that leverages
state of the art cryptographic primitives to mitigate prefix hijacking and in-
valid path attacks as well as to manage revocation and reassignment of IP
prefixes. Protocol reBGP uses Identity-Based Cryptography to eliminate
the requirement of a Public Key Infrastructure and aggregated signatures
to reduce the communication overhead.
In reBGP, a trusted authority (e.g., the ICANN) assigns an IP prefixes to
an AS issuing a prefix endorsement that certifies the AS as the originator
for that prefix. Similarly, the AS nodes sign their announcements within
a route endorsement that authorize their peers to propagate their routes.
This leads to a “chain of trust” that guarantees the validity of paths in the
network.
Protocol reBGP enjoys constant time route verification, so that the over-
head for the added security is minimal and balanced between the routers.
Furthermore, reBGP introduces a mechanism for route endorsement revo-
cation, allowing any AS to revoke previous endorsements, simply issuing
new ones. The new endorsement becomes immediately valid and auto-
matically revoke the old ones. The same approach is used by the ICANN
to revoke prefix endorsements, in order to reassign an IP prefix to a new
originator AS. Finally, protocol reBGP has been extensively simulated in
order to validate its correctness and to evaluate the introduced overheads
in terms of computations and communications.
Contribution 2 (Denial of Service Detection [43]) The Denial of Service
Attacks is a malicious activity aimed to negate a service or a resource to a
legitimate users; in literature, many results about this threat can be found,
since it represents a macro-category of attacks achievable in many context
(operating system, network, application based etc etc) and it does not re-
quire an high skill by the users.
Starting from the huge data set of real network data, this dissertation
contributes on the topic with (i) a validation the theoretical research re-
sults, namely applying the most used information theory metrics; (ii) the
analysis of the proposed metrics using a lightweight dump data set (i.e.,
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using the network data format provided by CISCOTM netflow protocol),
and (iii) reporting the ability to perform (D)DoS detection by the analysis
of “aggregated” network traffic data [43].
Furthermore, this thesis compares the different metrics and evaluate
their effectiveness against several network activities (like (D)DoS attacks
and nightly scheduled maintenance jobs), in terms of anomaly detection
and robustness.
Contribution 3 (Obfuscation of sensitive data in network Flows [41])
Real world network traffic traces represent a gold mine for different re-
search activities. Existing techniques proposed to sanitize network flows
do not provide any formal guarantees and, on the other side, many anony-
mization procedure does not preserve statistical and semantics property of
original data set, reducing data utility.
This dissertation provides a novel obfuscation technique, named (k, j)-
obfuscation, [41], for network flows that provides formal guarantees un-
der realistic assumptions about the adversary’s knowledge. The (k, j)-ob-
fuscation technique is supported by extensive experiments with a large set
of real network flows collected at an important Italian Tier II Autonomous
System, hosting sensitive government and corporate sites (section 2.5 pro-
vides a detailed description of the network data sources.).
Contribution 4 (Security risk on sharing ML Classifiers [56]) The shar-
ing of data between research communities is strongly significant to achieve
good results. Whether we speak about Machine Learning Classifier, many
countermeasures have been proposed. In this context, the results pro-
posed in this dissertation provide evidence that new kinds of attack ex-
ists, and that previous privacy preserving techniques do not provide any
formal or practical guarantee.
A new information leakage, that it has not been considered before,
is the outcomes presented in chapter 6. The contribution in this context
shows that it is unsafe to release trained classifiers since valuable infor-
mation about the training set can be extracted from them. Results show
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a new attack strategy: a meta-classifier can be trained to extract mean-
ingful data from targeted classifiers. Furthermore, chapter 6 describes
several attacks against existing ML classifiers, in particular, it presents
attack against an Internet traffic classifier implemented via Support Vec-
tor Machines (SVMs) and a speech recognition software based on Hidden
Markov Models (HMMs).
During my research, in addition to [41, 43, 56, 94], the following pub-
lications have also been presented:
• D.Vitali, A. Spognardi, L.V. Mancini, Replication schemes in Unattended
Sensor Networks, proceedings of the 4th IFIP International Conference
on New Technologies, Mobility and Security (NTMS), February 2011,
Paris, France (DOI 10.1109/NTMS.2011.5721047).
• D. Vitali, A. Spognardi, L. V. Mancini and A. Villani, MhRep: Multi-
hop Replication Scheme for Data Survival in Unattended Wireless Sen-
sor Networks, proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Reliable Dis-
tributed Systems Workshops (SRDSW), October 2011, Madrid, Spain
(DOI 10.1109/SRDSW.2011.15).
1.1.3 Thesis overview
Chapter 2 surveys the related works of the issues debated in this dis-
sertation.
Chapter 3 introduces reBGP, a new secure version of the Border Gate-
way Protocol, reBGP, which provides cryptographic guarantees against in-
valid path and false route announcements attacks. Furthermore, reBGP, does
not require the deployment of Public Key Infrastructure, hence, it can be
easily set to secure the Internet network.
Chapter 4 investigates the effectiveness of sundry Denial of Services
detection strategies based on several Information theory’s metrics using a
huge and real dataset of CISCOTM network flows.
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Chapter 5 presents a new obfuscation technique for network flows able
to provide formal guarantees of work under realistic assumptions on the
power of the adversary.
Chapter 6 introduces a new attack to the Machine Learning models
aiming to extract meaningful information which cannot be protected by
the previous privacy-aware techniques (e.g., privacy preserving data min-
ing or differential privacy)
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation and proposes future works.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
This chapter describes the state of the art of the topics addressed by
this dissertation.
2.1 Internet Routing Security
This section introduces the state of the art of the proposal aimed to
provide a secure Internet routing protocol.
Main security issues of the BGP protocol concern the control plane, i.e.,
the way BGP speakers build the routes of the Internet. Attacks to the con-
trol plane have direct implications on the data plane, that is how the traffic
is routed [58, 149]. This section reviews prominent works related to BGP
protocol and refer the reader to [19] for a comprehensive review of the
weaknesses of BGP.
Nowadays, the most debated solution to secure BGP is S-BGP, pro-
posed by Kent et al. in [73]. Their protocol provides a range of security
features for BGP but suffers from high management cost. In particular,
S-BGP assumes the deployment of two Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)
to authenticate UPDATE messages and the Internet resources (namely, AS
numbers and the association between IP prefixes and AS number).
Other PKI-based proposals are soBGP, [147], and psBGP, [110]. Pro-
tocol soBGP does not target AS-path authentication but only guarantees
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the authenticity of announcements made by IP prefix owners. Protocol
psBGP, [110], proposes to replace one of the PKIs required by S-BGP with
a reputation scheme. In particular, psBGP uses a centralized PKI for au-
thenticating AS numbers, and a decentralized trust model for verifying the
correctness of IP prefix origination. Goldber et al., [59], provides a quan-
titative comparison among the above BGP security proposals (S-BGP and
soBGP) and shows their weaknesses against several attacks.
SPV, [67], leverages Merkle Hash Trees to reduce the use of a central
PKI and one-time signatures to protect BGP against path forgeries. SPV is
a complex protocol that requires the management and the exchange of a
significant amount of state informations. Security flaws of SPV have been
exposed in [123]; the same work also suggests how to fix the protocol.
Zhao et al. [158] proposes to reduce the overhead introduced by S-
BGP, using aggregate signatures to sign/verify AS-paths in the UPDATEs.
In [158], multiple messages are combined together to obtain a Merkle Hash
Tree, so to sign only the root of the tree. However, the deployment of a PKI
like the one assumed in S-BGP [73] is still required.
The authors of [15] present an aggregate signature scheme that allows
for “lazy verification”. In this scheme, signers can add their signature to
the signed-so-far message and delay its verification at a later time. How-
ever, the scheme requires a per-singer random string that makes the sig-
nature length dependent on the number of singers.
A symmetric-key based approach is proposed in [16]. The authors
claim that their scheme affords UPDATE message authentication as long
as at least one router on the path is honest. Message complexity is linear
in the number of signer and verification cost is logarithmic in the number
of singers.
The idea of using Identity-Based Cryptography to avoid PKI in secure
BGP routing has been suggested by others papers (e.g., [57] and [10]) but,
it seems that there is no implementation nor evaluation. Notably, the au-
thors of [67] highlight the problem of revocation in Identity-Based settings,
one of the issues that protocol reBGP addresses (Chapter 3). The only BGP
proposal that leverages IB cryptography and has been evaluated, relies
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on Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), and is presented in [90]. Its authors
claim that AS-path authenticity can be guaranteed by checking only the
announcements of neighboring routers, as long as cryptographic keys and
routing policy management are enforced by a TPM running on each router.
In other words, the authors assume that signing key are sealed in the TPM
and routers cannot obtain a signature over a route that does not comply
with the routing policy. As a result, the security of the schema heavily de-
pends on the security of the TPM. Moreover, the authors do not discuss
how TPM keys should be revoked/updated when IP prefixes are moved
from one AS node to another.
2.2 Denial of Service attack detection strategies
This section overviews some results about the strategies for detection
of Denial of Service cyber attacks. As shown in the following, conflicting
results are the effect of the lack of the sharing of real network data.
Detection and mitigation of (D)DoS attacks is still an open challenge [38,
34]. A systematic analysis of DDoS attacks is presented by [101], where
the authors define a complete taxonomy of attacks, proposing different
criteria such as Exploited Weaknesses, Degree of Automation, Exploited
Weakness to Deny Service, Source Address Validity, Possibility of Char-
acterization, Dynamics, Persistence of Agent Set, Victim Type or Impact
on the Victim. Many results, like [53] and [112], agree upon the use of
Entropy and Relative Entropy (information divergence) as effective metrics
for anomaly detection (an introduction to those metrics will follow in Sec-
tion 4.2). In [53], the authors analyze several genuine network full traces,
using blocks of 1000 consecutive packets to compute entropy and frequency-
sorted distribution of selected packet attributes. The full network traces
used include the headers and the payloads of the packets. Since the net-
work traces are not known to contain malicious activities, the authors
overlay synthetic DDoS attacks at various degree of concentrations. An
attack alarm is raised if the computed entropy value overcomes a thresh-
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old, pre-determined from empirical analysis.
Authors in [112], show that the use of entropy of the IP addresses distri-
bution using fixed-dimension blocks of packets can be very time consum-
ing even for small organizations and imposes a CPU-burning process for
big bandwidth network edge. Moreover, they introduce a dynamic defini-
tion of alarm threshold in order to mitigate entropy fluctuations, based on
its standard deviation. Others works, like [107] and [129], improve attack
detection using other information theory metrics, like cumulative entropy.
Other entropy based metrics are based on the concepts of information di-
vergence, such as Rényi, [86], and Kullback-Leibler divergence, [85]. Their
main advantages are the ability to improve the anomaly detection, provid-
ing at the same time earlier responses and low false positive rate [150]. The
previous entropy based approaches, indeed, experience many false posi-
tives in case of fluctuations of traffic pattern. Section 4.3 of this dissertation
addresses these aspects.
Common issues of related works is the consistency and the nature of
used data sets. Almost all the papers refer to datasets that are histori-
cally consolidated (like the DARPA dataset) or that have been collected
from restricted and unrepresentative traffic, [53, 80]. DARPA dataset has
been created by the Information Systems Technology Group (IST) of MIT
Lincoln Laboratory, under Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL/SNHS) sponsorship.
The purpose of this dataset is to collect and distribute the first standard
corpora for evaluation of computer network Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS), [38, 39]. Although its nature, MIT datasets have been used by re-
searchers to evaluate malicious activities, like DoS or DDoS in sundry re-
searches, [85, 112, 107, 129]. The DARPA data sets are organized based on
the DDoS attacking software leading that these attacks have the simplic-
ity of structure and type in spite of the complexity of the real data. As
stated in [68], the methodology used to generate the data by MIT Lincoln
Laboratory and the nature of data itself are not appropriate for simulat-
ing different, non academic, network environments. So the experimental
results of many works suffer of the above limitation. In general, many pro-
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posed works use synthetic traffic in combination with attack-free network
traces, like [86] and [150]. Such a methodology can limit the validity of
the research results and lack of generality. In fact, malicious activities ar-
tificially injected can miss relevant features that real activities exhibit: this
lacking may produce unrealistic behavior and, in the worst case, unreal or
unexpected results. The work in [150] is an example of such limitation: in
order to enrich the simulations dataset, authors generate synthetic traffic
and attack traffic using, respectively, Gaussian and Poisson distributions.
Furthermore, the use of DARPA-2000 or other similar traces impose a
huge computation effort and technical limit. In fact, these dataset includes
tcpdump logs (TCP header and payload) and so require a non-negligible ef-
fort by network equipments and large computations efforts.
An alternative to full packet traces are CISCOTM Netflow, [139]. In fact,
CISCOTM Netflow provides a lightweight picture of the network since it
does not include the payload informations. One recent study that uses
CISCOTM Netflow technology to perform DDoS detection is [132], that
proposes a multi-layer approach that combines several steps on sampled
netflows. Again, in [132], synthetic attacks were introduced in the real
traffic gathered from a tier I ISP, in order to simulate DDoS attack.
Today, huge and real data sets are needed to analyze the emergent
types of coordinated and DDoS attacks, made by volunteer users, as oppo-
site to the early crackers with bad intention. A recent analysis of high tech
cyber threats to national critical infrastructures, [27], introduces the con-
cept of “hacktivism”, to emphasize the new user role. The authors report
some real cases where citizens were involved to disrupt national infras-
tructures, “carrying out politically-motivated hacking and bringing down
Government agencies’ website”. The recent Operation Payback is actually
a proof of this statement. Again, in the case of historically consolidated
datasets [112], it is easy to notice that they are too old to represent recent
(D)DoS attack under the hacktivists or zombies.
Instead, the analysis and results presented in Section 4.3.1, are based
on completely real network data with the known of real traffic anomalies.
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2.3 Obfuscation strategies
This section provides an overview on the obfuscation strategies pre-
viously presented in literature. Furthermore, this section presents the at-
tacks that can be performed on anonymized network data sets.
Early techniques for network flows obfuscation were based on the en-
cryption of source and destination IP addresses. However, those tech-
niques proved to be ineffective, since an adversary might be able to re-
identify message source and destination by other values in a network flow,
or in a sequence of flows (see, e.g., [14, 153, 13, 32]).
King et al. in [76] proposes an extensive taxonomy of attacks against
network flow sanitization methods; techniques fall into two main cate-
gories:
• Fingerprinting: re-identification is performed by matching flows fields’
values to the characteristics of the target environment (such as knowl-
edge of network topology and its settings, types of OS and services
of target hosts, etc). Typical re-identifying values for network flows
are: Type of Service (tos), TCP Flags, timestamps, number of bytes,
and number of packets per flow.
• Injection: the adversary injects a sequence of flows in the network to
be logged, that are easily recognized due to their specific characteris-
tics; e.g., marked with uncommon TCP flags, or following particular
patterns. In order to perform this attack, the adversary must know
in advance in which network the flows will be collected, and during
which time period.
Additional techniques can be used to exploit the results of the above
attacks to decrypt IP addresses of new network flows. In particular, if the
IP address encryption is performed with the same key across the whole
set of flows (as in most existing defense techniques), and the adversary
discovers an IP mapping in one flow, he can decrypt the same IP address
in any other flow.
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2.3.1 Defenses tailored to network flows
Several efforts have been devoted to the implementation of frameworks
(e.g., [134]) or configurable tools (e.g., [54]) through which the network ad-
ministrator can define ad-hoc and per-field obfuscation policies.
Roughly speaking, defenses that can be found in the literature (e.g., [14,
115] among many others) take a “reactionary” approach: typically, in those
works, a new kind of attack is identified, and a defense technique is pro-
posed for that attack, which is generally based on the permutation or gen-
eralization of some fields’ values. However, proposed techniques do not
provide a general solution. Indeed, as theoretically proved by Brekne and
Årnes in [13], and empirically shown by Burkhart et al. in [18], those tech-
niques can be easily defeated by the injection of flows following complex
patterns over sufficiently long periods of time.
As a case study, it can be considered the well-known Crypto-PAn [52]
technique, which is currently incorporated within several network flow
collector tools. Crypto-PAn is a sanitization tool for network flows that
encrypts IP addresses in a prefix-preserving manner. Crypto-PAn has the
following properties: (a) it performs a one-to-one mapping from original
IP addresses to anonymized IP addresses, based on AES encryption; (b)
IP address encryption is prefix-preserving; and (c) it is consistent across the
whole set of released traces.
A malicious user, which acts inside the monitored network, can inject
bogus and easily detectable flows (i.e., marked with uncommon TCP Flags
that match distinguishing statistical or behavioral patterns) in order to un-
derstand how one IP address is mapped to its encrypted value inside the
obfuscated flow set.
The defense technique described in section 5.1 adopts cryptographic
primitives to hide real IP addresses (Pseudo Random Number Generator),
and obfuscation of flow fields’ values. However, differently from previous
works, it provides strong confidentiality protection even when the adver-
sary can reconstruct the mapping between an IP address and its encrypted
value, possibly as a result of injection attacks.
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2.3.2 Microdata anonymization techniques
Techniques proposed in the database area for microdata anonymiza-
tion have the advantage of providing formal privacy guarantees, under
specific assumptions. Hence, it is natural to investigate the application
of these techniques to network flows. At first glance, network flow logs
seem very similar in nature to any other record sets stored in a relational
database (census data, medical records, etc.). However, as explained be-
low, those techniques are unfeasible to network flows, due to the peculiar
characteristics of these data.
The simplest microdata anonymity principle is k-anonymity [128], which
consists in making any record indistinguishable in a group of at least k
records based on Quasi Identifier (QI) values; i.e., values that, joined with
external information, may reduce the candidate set of record respondents.
Any group of records having the same values for QI attributes is called
a QI-group. The main criticism found in the literature about the applica-
tion of this principle to network flow logs (see, e.g., [31]) regards loss of
information: indeed, since many fields of network flows may act as QI,
data quality would be degraded to an unacceptable extent. The same ar-
gument holds for more sophisticated privacy principles that guarantee not
only anonymity but also sensitive value diversity, such as l-diversity [95]
and t-closeness [89].
However, it can be observed that the above mentioned principles are
not even applicable to the anonymization of network flows. Indeed, if the
private value of each individual does not change in released microdata
(this is the case of network flow logs, if IP address encryption is consistent
across the whole set of flows), works in [128, 95, 89] are effective only
under the assumption that each individual is the respondent of at most
one record in the released microdata. Indeed, if the adversary knows that
the same individual (in this case the IP address I) is the respondent of one
tuple in more than one QI-group, an adversary may be able to derive the
confidential information (the encryption of I) by simply intersecting the
private values of tuples in those QI-groups.
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Since the same IP address typically appears in multiple network flows,
an appropriate privacy principle to be considered is m-invariance [151],
which has been proposed to enforce both anonymity and diversity for
incremental release of microdata. This principle ensures that (i) all the
QI-groups in which an individual’s records appear have the same set of
private values, and (ii) each QI-group does not contain records having the
same private value. However, the application of m-invariance to network
flow logs is unfeasible, since the cardinality of IP addresses is very large;
this would result in a very coarse generalization of QI-values, and in the
introduction of a large number of counterfeit flows to enforce property (i).
In order to overcome the above problems, the (k, j)-obfuscation tech-
nique introduced in section 5.1, adopt a many-to-one mapping among
IP addresses and encrypted values; this mapping is consistent across the
whole set of network flows.
In general, the fact that two specific hosts A and B exchanged some
messages may be considered confidential information. Hence, since an
IP address uniquely identifies its host, the (k, j)-obfuscation technique as-
sumes that confidential information in a network flow is the set of at-
tributes {src_addr, dst_addr}. Indeed, if removing those fields from net-
work logs, no confidentiality violation could reasonably be perpetrated.
Unfortunately, removal of IP addresses from logs would completely dis-
rupt the utility of the data. Note that, from the point of view of privacy
preservation, it is not relevant distinguishing between source and desti-
nation IP, since in many cases a flow from A to B (request) implies the
existence of a flow from B to A (response). When joined with external
information, fields in the network flow other than IP addresses may re-
strict the candidate set of source and/or destination hosts. For instance,
as shown in [153], based on network flow data such as packet and byte
counts, it is possible to identify the Web server originating the request.
Observation 4 A network flow is obfuscated if it cannot be associated with high
confidence to its source and destination IP addresses.
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2.4 Leakage of Machine Learning models
This section describes the security and privacy concerns related to the
real data indirectly released. In fact, as introduced in section 1.1, security
and privacy concerns are not only related to raw network data, but may
affects mathematical models used in Machine Learning algorithms.
In the past, many results on this topic have been published. Although
the scope of the results reported in section 6 is strictly related to informa-
tion leakages issues, this section briefly describes also relevant results in
terms of privacy concerns, i.e., Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM), [142]
and Differential Privacy, [44]. It is worth describing some of these related
results, even though this thesis considers a the type of leakage which has
not been considered before.
As formalized by Dwork in [44], differential privacy deals with the gen-
eral problem of privacy preserving analysis of data. More formally, a ran-
domized mechanism M provides e−differential privacy if, for a database D1 and
D2, which differ by at most one element, and for any t:
Pr[M(D1) = t]
Pr[M(D2) = t]
≤ ee
In the differential privacy model, a trusted server holds a database with
sensitive information. Answers to queries are perturbed by the addition
of random noise generated according to a random distribution (usually
a Laplace distribution). Two settings are defined: non interactive, where
the trusted server computes and publishes statistics on the original data,
and interactive, where the server sits in the middle and directly alters the
answers to user queries to guarantee specific privacy properties.
Chaudhuri et al. [24] design a privacy preserving logistic regression al-
gorithm which works in the e−differential privacy model [45]. The idea
is quite simple: the result of the trained classifier is perturbed with a dy-
namic amount of noise. This approach does not consider the security is-
sues due to the exposure of the model generated during the learning phase
of the linear regression algorithm.
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Other machine learning algorithms, such as Decision Trees, Artificial Neu-
ral Networks, Clustering, have been re-engineered to provide differential
privacy and several of them are defined within the SulQ framework [9].
Privacy Preserving Data Mining, [1], is a research area aimed at devel-
oping techniques that perform data mining primitives while protecting
the privacy of individual data records. In [142], Verykios et al. classi-
fied PPDM techniques in five classes. Among them, the Privacy preserva-
tion class refers to techniques used to preserve privacy for selective mod-
ifications of data records. This can be achieved through heuristic val-
ues (e.g., selecting the values that minimize the utility loss of the data),
cryptographic protocols (e.g., via Secure Multiparty Computation [93]), or
reconstruction-based techniques (e.g., strategy aimed at reconstructing the
original data distribution using randomized data).
2.5 Monitored network
The research activities I worked on were funded by the European pro-
ject ExtrABIRE, [30]. The objective of the project as to evaluate the overall
resiliency of the Internet infrastructure of a Member State and, more generally, to
assess the impacts of a coordinated cyber-attack on its Internet infrastructure.The
final aim of the Project is to develop a national Internet contingency plan that
will include the identification of processes, procedures, organizational issues and
technical countermeasures that Member States and private organizations should
adopt and implement to mitigate threats to their Internet connectivity1.
One of the partners of the ExtrABIRE project is the CASPUR consor-
tium (Consorzio interuniversitario per le Applicazioni di Supercalcolo Per
Università e Ricerca,2). The collaboration with the CASPUR allowed me
the ability of analyze a big amount of real data. In fact, during these activ-
ities, an important AS node of the Internet infrastructure has been moni-
1With the respect of the Non-Disclosure-Agreement of the ExTrABIRE project, no de-
tailed information about AS (such as AS name or number) nor ISP interconnections will
be provided to preserve AS and host privacy.
2http://www.caspur.it
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tored. During this research activities, a probe of network flows collected
more than 2 years of CiscoTM netflows: these data are essential for the
results proposed in this dissertation.
The monitored network is represented in Figure 2.1. The network probe
has been installed within the AS3. The AS3 reaches the Internet through
a Tier2 and a Tier1 AS node and, at the same time, it is the Upstream
provider for AS1, acting as backup link. Furthermore, the AS3 provides
sundry services, e.g. web hosting, mail servers and end-user X-DSL con-
nections. During the collection phase, the AS1 was target of many attacks
and malicious activities and these data have been used to verify the effec-
tiveness of the DoS detection metrics (chapter 4).
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Figure 2.1: Monitored network architecture.
Since AS3 is composed by heterogeneous networks and services, it can
be considered as a good testing case for the research activity proposed
in this dissertation; furthermore, it is general enough to represent many
real contexts. To show the dimension of the monitored AS node, AS3,
table 2.1 reports the average of the exchanged traffic. Considering that it
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manages thousands of unique IP addresses and that the amount of packets
is around 30Kbits/seconds, the monitored AS node can be considered of
medium size for an European member state.
Time of the day Flows/s Packets/s Mbit/s
00:00AM-11:00AM 377/312 8.8K/6.4K 37/44
11:00AM-06:00PM 1.3Kb/930 21Kb/13K 113/54
06:00PM-11:59PM 764/575 14Kb/8K 80/27
Table 2.1: Monitored network: bandwidth and traffic characterization (in-
put/output).
Netflows dataset
The Netflow protocol is a CiscoTM technology used for monitoring IP
traffic [139]. Despite the classical packet collector (packet dump), Netflow
only collects data in Layers 2-4.
Netflow efficiently monitors a network, enabling services like traffic
accounting, usage-based network billing, network planning, as well as
Denial of Services monitoring. Netflow records are extremely compacts
and representative, avoiding to maintain the packet’s payload and making
analysis and computation lighter. While several kind of attacks crafted in
the traffic payload are able to circumvent the detection filter, traffic anoma-
lies are still effectively observable. Netflow is recognized as a network
monitoring tool: many research papers as well as professional software
use Netflow protocol as source of data to query network status or get back
data logs.
The typical configuration to leverage the Netflow protocol is made
by a router with netflow capabilities (netflow exporter) and a probe (net-
flow collector) able to store received data (see Figure 2.1). Netflow records
are sent as a UDP stream of bytes. A netflow-enabled router creates one
record with only selected fields from the TCP headers of each transiting
connection (Figure 2.2): a single netflow record is a unidirectional sequence
of packets all sharing the 7 values source and destination IP addresses,
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Figure 2.2: How a Netflow enabled device exports netflow records. This
image is taken from Introduction to CiscoTM IOS Netflow.
source and destination ports (for UDP or TCP, 0 for other protocols), IP
protocol, Ingress interface (SNMP ifIndex) and IP Type of Service. Other
valuable informations associated to the flow, like timestamps, duration,
number of packets and transmitted bytes, are also recorded. A single flow
is a record that represents the data exchanged between two hosts only in
one direction, since it aggregates all the IP packets that composed a single
communication session. Indeed, a single TCP connection is represented by
two distinct flows in opposite directions, despite the number of IP packets
or the number of exchanged bytes.
A netflow-enabled router sends to the probe a single flow as soon as
the relative connection expires. This can happen when (i) when TCP con-
nection reaches the end of the byte stream (FIN flag or RST flag are set);
(ii) when a flow is idle for a specific timeout; (iii) if a connection exceeds
long live terms (30 minutes by default).
The use of Netflow technology has several advantages with respect to
the raw packet sniffing, since using just few information it is able to give
a lightweight picture of monitored network. Several researches proposed
netflow collectors as IDSs (Intrusion Detection Systems), [22], traffic clas-
sifiers, [42], and others security tools. To have a flavor of the advantages of
a netflow dataset in terms of dimension and required effort, the following
statistics can be considered: a 2 G Bytes of full netflow entries contains 110
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millions of flows, 2 billions of packets and about 1, 5 T Byte of exchanged
data, corresponding to the data gathered in one single day. Until today,
the dataset used in this dissertation consists in a collection of 48 months
long netflow records (about 4 T Bytes of data) and it keeps growing.
Note that, despite the advantage of low computational requirements
to process an extensive amount of data, netflows inevitably sacrifice a lot
of valuable information related to traffic payload: carried attacks to single
host services, virus or malware specific signatures, particular malformed
packets and so on, are dropped and cannot be recovered from netflows.
In this configuration, due to some privacy issues, it is not possible to ac-
cess to the whole payload to perform a full packet inspection. In fact,
the monitored network contains several governmental networks that ex-
change sensitive data and any access to their packet payloads is restricted.
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Chapter 3
Relieve Internet Routing security
of Public Key Infrastructure
This chapter introduces the protocol reBGP, a secure BGP protocol that
mitigate prefix hijacking and invalid path attacks.
3.1 BGP fundamentals
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the IETF standard routing pro-
tocol on the Internet. It is a path vector protocol in which routers choose
the route with the “best” path for inclusion in the routing table and an-
nounce the selected path to other neighbors. Selection of the best path
depends on many factors, like local preference, commercial agreement or
path length (refer to [126] for more details.).
Every BGP router is referred to as a “BGP speaker”. Each of them
is directly connected to a number of neighbors with whom it exchanges
routing information and network packets. The AS node responsible for
a specific network is said to be the originator, while all the AS nodes that
can be traversed to reach that network constitute one AS-path for that pre-
fix. Hence, the originator issues the announcement of a prefix, while other
The work described in this chapter is a joint work with L.V.Mancini, A. Spognardi,
A. Villani and C. Soriente and it appeared in the International Conference on Computer
Communication Networks (ICCCN2012), [94].
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AS nodes along the AS-path propagate the announcement, appending their
AS number to the received AS-path. Since a network prefix represents the
identity of a network it is also called Network Layer Reachability Infor-
mation (NLRI). An NLRI is composed of a length and a prefix. The length
is a network mask in CIDR notation (e.g.: /25) specifying the number of
network bits, and the prefix is the Network address for that subnet. An
NLRI would look something like: 192.168.1.0/24..
Once a network becomes unreachable for an AS node, it forwards a
withdrawal message for that route to its neighbors: those, in turn, choose
and propagate an alternative route (if any) for that network. In particular,
BGP speakers exchange announcements, propagations and withdrawals
within UPDATE messages.
3.1.1 Security threats and adversary model
The mechanism BGP uses to propagate routing data is extremely sim-
ple: an AS node receives announcements, store it and according with its
routing policies, propagates them. This simplicity has determined its suc-
cess but, at the same time, it is also the cause of many dangerous attacks
against Internet. In fact, each speaker constructs its routing table only
using the information received by its neighbors. Nothing prevents any
speaker to behave maliciously and advertise to its peers prefixes it is not
responsible of or routes that it cannot actually reach. This kind of behavior
is the one reBGP, [94], seeks to mitigate.
Similarly to relevant work in the area [73, 67], this dissertation con-
siders an active insider adversary that performs falsification attacks. The
attacker can compromise any BGP speaker and inject fake BGP messages
that do not reflect the real network topology. In particular, the adversary
has access to all the cryptographic material the compromised router stores
and can sign or encrypt any message on behalf of that router. The aim of
the adversary is to subvert the correct BGP functioning in order to alter
the normal routing of the traffic in Internet.
Protocol reBGP assumes that the adversary can falsify NLRI informa-
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(a) Prefix Hijacking attack (b) Invalid Path attack
(c) Blackhole attack
Figure 3.1: BGP threats: illegal prefixes and falsified AS-path attacks.
tion in order to perform a prefix hijacking and the AS-path attribute of an
UPDATE message, in order to perform an invalid path attack [90].
Prefix hijacking
With this attack a compromised router can introduce UPDATE mes-
sages for networks that it does not administrate. For example, it could
pretend to be the originator of a prefix 10.0.0.0/16 announcing that prefix
to its neighbors (like the malicious AS node M of Figure 3.1(a) that an-
nounces IPA owned by AS A). Or, it could announce more specific prefixes
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of that network (like 10.0.0.0/18): longer prefixes, in fact, are preferred
respect to smaller ones, since they are less specific (as happened in the
Youtube hijack cyber attack).
Once the route eventually propagates to other AS nodes, the best path
selection process for 10.0.0.0 would consider the regular path and the fal-
sified one. In this way, the compromised router would attract all the traffic
directed to 10.0.0.0 (or to a subnet) generated by the AS nodes that choose
the falsified route.
Invalid path attack
In this attack the adversary issues UPDATE messages with a fabricated
AS-path. For example the attacker can shorten a route of any NLRI simply
removing some or even all the AS nodes from the AS-path attribute. This
attack is depicted in Figure 3.1(b), where the AS node M drops from the
AS-path for IPA the AS nodes B and C. The invalid path attack can lead to
a blackhole that is related to the data plane security issues. In particular, a
blackhole happens when a malicious AS attracts traffic that would not flow
through it, exploiting falsified AS-paths. For example, the AS node M of
Figure 3.1(c) using a fake AS-path is able to attract the traffic towards IPA
from the victim AS V. Similarly, the attacker could modify the AS-path
introducing some random AS in order to enlarge the path or to produce
loops. In general, the effects of an invalid path attack would impact on the
best route selection algorithm: shorter paths would be preferred against
longer ones, while paths that include loops would be directly discarded as
malformed routes.
3.1.2 Revocation in BGP
Just as in reBGP, signature-based solutions to secure BGP, e.g., [73], au-
thenticate AS-paths by nesting the signatures of each AS on the path. In
such a setting, revocation is performed by the trusted authority in charge
of issuing public key certificates, that revokes the certificate of malicious
or simply eliminated AS nodes. From that moment on, all announcements
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made by the revoked AS are discarded by other peers. Other solutions,
e.g. [67], propose to leverage the concept of “epochs”, namely, they as-
sume time is divided in periods of fixed length, after which all routes must
be re-advertised. Nevertheless, a dynamic environment like the Internet
requires fine-grained revocation means. For example, consider autono-
mous system ASi that authorizes its neighbor ASj to advertise its prefixes
10.0.0.0 and 11.0.0.0. Later on, ASi changes its commercial strategy and de-
cides that ASj should keep advertising 10.0.0.0, but 11.0.0.0 should only be
advertised by another peer, say ASl. PKI certificate revocation is clearly a
poor match in this scenario due to the large amount of communication and
computational requirements. Moreover, AS nodes should retain complete
control of the authorization they distribute or revoke, without resorting to
a trusted third party. A possible solution would be for ASi to sign a mes-
sage that invalidates all announcements made by ASj about 11.0.0.0 and
to broadcast it. However, this would generate a considerable number of
messages. reBGP tackles selective revocation embedding revocation infor-
mation within AS-path announcement. In the above example, ASi would
just provide an authorization for ASl to announce a path towards 11.0.0.0.
As explained in the next sections, the authorization itself carries enough
informations that allow other peers to accept the new route as the genuine
one and to discard any further announcement made by ASj on the old
route for 11.0.0.0.
3.2 Cryptographic primitives
This section reviews the main cryptographic primitives used in the pro-
tocol reBGP, namely Identity-based Aggregate Signatures.
3.2.1 Identity-based Aggregate Signature
Traditional public key cryptography relies on one or more trusted au-
thorities that issue certificates to bind users to public keys. Hence, before
encrypting a message under one’s public key, its authenticity must be ver-
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ified by means of a valid certificate issued by the authority. Similarly, a
certificate is required to validate the (public) verification key of a party,
before verifying its signatures.
Certificate distribution and management requires a complex infras-
tructure known as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). While traditional cryp-
tography has been previously recommended to secure Internet-domain
routing [73], the proposal has never been adopted because of the involve-
ment of the PKI and complex trust relations among its components.
Identity Base (IB) Cryptography is an effective alternative to traditional
Public Key cryptography that relies on certificates to endorse public key
authenticity. In an IB cryptographic scheme, the identities of the parties
“are” their public keys. In other words, any string can serve as a pub-
lic key; corresponding private keys are managed and issued by a trusted
authority, referred to as Private Key Generator (PKG). The latter is only
active when issuing new keys.
The main advantages of the IBE Cryptosystems, are related to the its
use of user identity’s attributes (e.g email addresses or identity numbers)
instead of digital certificates, for cryptographic operations. This environ-
ment significantly reduces the complexity of a cryptography system by
eliminating the need for generating and managing users’ certificates, so
reducing communication and computational costs. Although an IBE cryp-
tosystems avoids the need a PKI, it relies on a trusted third party, namely
the Private Key Generator (PKG) which generates and issues the pub-
lic/private keypairs. Furthermore, using such settings, there is no need
to managing a public key infrastructure, including the CRLs (Certificate
Revocation Lists).
It is relevant of mention other advantages of an IBC. In a IBC all the
encryption keys are always available for all recipients. In fact, the encryp-
tion key is derived mathematically from the receiver’s identity. This con-
dition also assures the server can securely regenerate keys for recipients as
needed.
Identity Based Aggregate Signatures (IBAS) allow multiple users to
sign multiple messages and aggregate all signatures in a fixed-size token.
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Given the identity of the signing parties, the signed messages and the ag-
gregated signature, anyone can verify the validity of the signatures over
their respective messages.
More formally, an IBAS scheme can be defined as a tuple of the form:
Setup, ExKey, Sign, Agg, Veri f y
where:
• pkPKG, skPKG ← Setup(λ) on input security parameter λ, outputs the
PKG public/private key pair pkPKG, skPKG.
• pki, ski ← ExKey(skPKG, i) on input the PKG private key sk and a
string i, outputs public/private key pair pki, ski.
• σ ← Sign(ski, m) on input secret key ski and message m produces a
signature on m under key ski.
• σ ← Agg(σ1, . . . , σn) on input signatures σ1, . . . , σn produces an ag-
gregated signature σ.
• {0, 1} ← Veri f y(pkPKG, σ, m1, ...mn, i1, . . . , in) takes as input public
key pkPKG, a number of messages m1, . . . , mn with their respective
signers i1, . . . , in and the aggregate of their signatures σ; it outputs 1
if σ← Agg(σ1, . . . , σn) and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, σi ← Sign(ski, mi).
Protocol reBGP uses the IBAS scheme proposed in [57] that allows mul-
tiple signers to sign multiple messages in such a way that the total verifi-
cation information, apart from a description of who signed what, consists
only of a short aggregate signature. In the following, the algorithms in [57]
has briefly reviewed:
Setup(λ) is run by the PKG to define its secret key and public parameters:
1. Define groups G, GT of prime order q and bilinear map e : G× G →
GT
2. Pick arbitrary generator P ∈ G
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3. Randomly pick s ∈ Zq and set Q = sP
4. Define Hash functions H1, H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq
5. Set skPKG = s and pkPKG = G, GT, e, P, Q, H1, H2, H3
ExKey(skPKG, IDi) is run by the PKG to compute the secret key of singer
with identity IDi:
1. Set ski = {sPi,0, sPi,1} where Pi,j = H1(IDi, j) ∈ G
Sign(ski, mi) is run by signer with identity IDi to sign an arbitrary mes-
sage mi:
1. Pick random string w
2. Compute Pw = H2(w) ∈ G
3. Compute ci = H3(mi, IDi, w)
4. Pick random ri ∈ Zq
5. Compute σi = (w, S′i, T
′
i ) where
S′i = riPw + sPi,0 + cisPi,1 and T
′
i = riP.
Aggregate(σ1, . . . ,σn) allows to aggregate an arbitrary number of signa-
ture that use the same w. The procedure can be run by any party as it
requires no secrets.
1. Parse σi as (w, S′i, T
′
i )
2. Compute σ1,...,n = (w,∑ni=1 S
′
i,∑
n
i=1 T
′
i )
Verify(pkPKG,σ1,...,n, m1, . . . , mn, ID1, . . . , IDn) is run to verify an aggre-
gate signature σ1,...,n where each singer IDi has signed message mi (1 ≤
i ≤ n).
1. Parse σ1,...,n as (w, Sn, Tn)
2. Check that
e(Sn, P) = e(Tn, Pw) · e(Q,∑ni=1 Pi,0 +∑ni=1 ciPi,1)
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The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model, assuming
the hardness of computational Diffie-Hellman over groups with bilinear
maps.
3.3 Protocol reBGP
Protocol reBGP relies on the IBAS scheme described in the previous
section. The latter guarantees the authenticity of both route announce-
ments and AS-path announcements, with a constant overhead in terms of
communication and verification.
Each announcement is signed by the sender for a specific receiver. The
obtained signature is the route endorsement that authorizes the receiving AS
to propagate those routes. This allows senders to control which peers can
further propagate their announcements. In particular, when ASi wishes
to announce a route towards prefix IPl to its peer ASj, it signs the route
ASj, ASi, IPj.
Signatures are “nested” to thwart path truncation or AS replacement
attacks. Hence, if ASj wishes to further propagate the received announce-
ment to peer ASp, it adds ASp on the path and signs it. In other words,
ASj signs ASp, ASj, ASi, IPl and sends the announcement to ASp. ASj also
sends the aggregate signature resulting from the aggregation of its signa-
ture and the one received by ASi. This signature is the route endorsement
from ASj towards ASp.
Protocol reBGP assumes that all paths “originate” at the PKG. That
is, if ASi is assigned IP block IPl, the PKG (i.e., the ICANN) signs the
route ASi, IPl and sends the signature to ASi. Clearly, ASi owns IPl so this
hop is authenticated by the PKG. However, reBGP leverages this design
choice to use a single algorithm to verify both route origination and AS-
path announcements.
Since reBPG uses IB-cryptography, verification keys (i.e., the public
key) do not need to be checked against certificates. Moreover, thanks to
signature aggregation, communication and verification overhead is inde-
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pendent on the number of signers (i.e., independent of the path length).
Protocol reBGP provides a simple yet effective mechanism to allow AS
nodes to revoke announcements that were previously signed. This feature
is particularly desirable in an extremely dynamic environment like the In-
ternet, where relocation of IP blocks and modifications to agreements be-
tween AS nodes happens at a very high rate.
The basic idea is to include counters, denoted as α-values, in each
signed announcement. Each AS that propagates an announcement for an
IP block to a peer, adds a counter on the path before signing. Given two
valid announcements (i.e., two announcements with valid signatures), P =
. . . , ASj, ASj−1, . . . , AS1, IPl and Q = . . . , AS′j, ASj−1, . . . , AS1, IPl, assume
that they traverse the same AS nodes up to ASj−1 (i.e., ASj 6= AS′j). Any
AS receiving P and Q will consider P as revoked if the α-value used by
ASl−1 when signing P is smaller than the α-value used by ASl−1 when
signing Q. If the two α values match, both paths are considered valid. The
same technique can be used by the PKG to re-assign IP blocks. On the
other side, AS must store sets of counters received in announcements by
other peers for any IP block. The latter are referred to as β-values.
In the following, the operations carried out by the PKG and AS nodes
in reBGP are provided.
System Setup
Protocol reBGP assumes the PKG to be the ICANN as the latter is already
a trusted party in the Internet domain. At this time, the PKG sets up the
parameters for an IBAS scheme as in [57] and runs Setup(λ) to define its
public/private key pair pkPKG, skPKG.
AS join.
The AS nodes are identified by their number that is also used as a unique
identity for IB cryptographic operations. When AS with number ASi joins
the system, the PKG runs ExKey(skPKG, ASi) to extract public/private key
pairs pki, ski; the latter is securely delivered to ASi.
ASi also keeps two sets of counters. Set αi has one counter for each IP
block that ASi knows a path to, such that αi(l) is the α-value of ASi related
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to block IPl. Set βi has one counter for each AS on each path towards each
IPl that ASi knows, so that βi(j, l) is the β-value stored by ASi and related
to ASj that lies on the path ASi  ASj  IPl. All records of both data
structures are initialized to zero.
IP block assignment
Protocol reBGP treats assignment of IP blocks to AS nodes as BGP an-
nouncements from the PKG; in other words, when IP block IPl is assigned
to ASi, the PKG “authorizes” ASi to announce that IP block. In particular,
PKG computes
1. αPKG(l) = αPKG(l) + 1
2. m = ASi, αPKG(l), IPl
3. σ← Sign(ski, m)
and sends m, σ to ASi. Note that message m states that PKG authorizes
ASi to advertise a path towards IPl.
Route propagation
Assume that ASi wants to advertise a route towards block IPl to neighbor
ASj. Without loss of generality, denote with m the message that adver-
tised1 the route to ASi and denote with α the corresponding signature.
ASi does the following:
1. αi(l) = αi(l) + 1
2. m′ = ASj, αi(l), m
3. σ′ ← Sign(ski, m′)
4. σ∗ ← Agg(σ′, σ)
and sends m′, σ∗ to ASj. Note that ASi adds αi(l) to the signed message.
The α-value will be used by receiving AS nodes to verify the freshness
of the announcement. In particular, increasing αi(l) before including it in
1In case ASi is the owner of IPl , then m = ASi, αPKG(l), IPl .
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the message to ASj guarantees that ASj is the only AS that is currently
authorized by ASi to announce routes towards IPj. In other words, all
previous authorizations endorsed by ASi to advertise a path towards IPl
are implicitly revoked.
Route verification
Assume that ASi receives a message with a path towards IPl, that is, the
received message is
m = ASi, αin(l), ASin , . . . , αi1(j), ASi1 , αPKG(l), IPl
where αin(l), ASin , . . . , αi1(l), ASi1 might have zero length if ASi has been
assigned IPl by the PKG.
Assume also that σ is the aggregate signature for this message. ASi
does the following:
1. For w = n− 1, . . . , 1, check if αiw(l) ≥ βi(iw, l); otherwise discard the
message as the route is not the most up to date to reach IPl.
2. If the path has length greater than 1, check if αPKG(l) > βi(PKG, l);
otherwise the block IPl is not assigned to ASi1 anymore.
3. Check if 1← Veri f y(m, σ); otherwise discard the message as at least
one signer failed to compute a valid signature.
If all checks succeed, the route is valid and ASi can update its routing
tables. This includes setting βi(j, l) = αj(l) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} ∪ {PKG}.
The α and β values are used in reBGP for route revocation and multi-
homing (Figure 3.2). In Figure 3.2(a), AS5 reaches IPj owned by AS1,
through AS3 and AS2. That is, AS5 received the following message from
A3:
m = AS5, α3(j), AS3, α2(j), AS2, α1(j), AS1, αPKG(j), IPj
Now assume that AS2 changes its routing policy and decides that AS4
should be its upstream peer for routes towards IPj; at the same time AS2
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: Route revocation in BGP.
Figure 3.3: Route revocation in BGP for Multi-Homing AS.
decides to revoke this capability to AS3. The updated topology is depicted
in Figure 3.2(b). In order to endorse the new routing policy, AS2 sings a
new AS-path towards IPj where the link AS2, AS4 has α2(j) greater than
the one used by AS2 when it authorized the link AS2, AS3. In particular,
the message sent by AS2 to AS4 is
m˜ = AS4, α˜2(j), AS2, α1(j), AS1, αPKG(j), IPj
where α˜2(j) > α2(j). Eventually, AS4 will announce a route towards IPj to
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AS5. The latter will detect the updated α-value used by AS2 and acknowl-
edge the new path as the only valid one.
Another possibility is for AS2 to keep AS3 as an upstream AS for paths
towards IPj and, at the same time, authorize also AS4 to announce routes
towards that IP block. This scenario, referred to as “multi-homing”, is
depicted in Figure 3.3. In order to do so, AS2 sends to AS4 the following
message:
m˜ = AS4, α˜2(j), AS2, α1(j), AS1, αPKG(j), IPj
where α˜2(j) = α2(j). Each AS (including AS5) receiving the new AS-path
announcement by AS4 will detect no changes in the α-value used by AS2
in announcements related to IPj and will acknowledge the new route as
an alternative one.
3.3.1 Security analysis
Security of reBGP is straightforward assuming the security of the un-
derlying IBAS scheme. As the network prefixes are assigned by the PKG
through prefix endorsements, a prefix hijack attack would require the ad-
versary to forge signatures by the PKG on arbitrary messages. Similarly,
invalid path attacks require the adversary to forge signatures by other AS
routers. One major drawback of IBAS is that an unsuccessful verification
of an aggregate signature cannot be traced back to the signer(s) that pro-
duced invalid signatures. In other words, any party can mount a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack modifying an aggregated signature so that the verifi-
cation algorithm would fail. However, DoS attacks are beyond the scope
of reBGP. Finally, similarly to other related works [67, 59], protocol reBGP
does not consider collusion among compromised routers (i.e. the collu-
sion attacks or tunneling attacks, [117]) and the design of a secure routing
protocol that effectively counters a number of colluding nodes is still an
open research problem.
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3.4 Evaluation
The evaluation of the overall overheads includes the estimation of the
space requirement in terms of volatile memory (Section 3.4.1), computa-
tional costs (Section 3.4.2) and time delay (Section 3.4.3), namely the ex-
pected convergence time.
Similarly to other works, [90, 158], in order to evaluate the computa-
tional overhead and the introduced delay, the SSFNet simulator [137] has
been used. SSFNet provides a simulation environment for BGP as well as
for other network protocols. All the measurements of reBGP are compared
with S-BGP.
3.4.1 Space complexity
Although nowadays BGP routers have reasonable resources, volatile
memory represents a strict constraint for routing algorithms; notably, this
aspect becomes more and more relevant when routers have to maintain
the routing table for all reachable network prefixes in the Internet. The
most important contribution to memory occupation is related to crypto-
graphic material, namely signatures and keys.
Signature requirements
In [73], the authors suggest to implement S-BGP with the Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (DSA), mainly due to its smaller signature, compared
to RSA. With 1024-bit keys, DSA produces 40-byte signatures, versus 128-
byte signatures typical of RSA. This thesis considers S-BGP using DSA
with 1024-bit keys.
In contrast, reBGP leverages elliptic curves in order to use smaller keys
but still afford computationally equivalent security [83]. In particular, reBGP
uses 140-bit keys with 120-byte signatures and offers the same security
level of DSA with 1024-bit keys.
While S-BGP DSA signatures grow linearly with respect to the AS-path
length, reBGP aggregated signatures are fixed in size, regardless of the
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path’s length. This aspect makes reBGP particularly suitable to protect
path vector protocols like BGP. In order to estimate memory requirements
for S-BGP and reBGP with real data, the Routing Information Base (RIB) of
one of the collector routers owned by RIPEncc2 has been considered. The
RIB is the table that holds all routing information received from routing
peers, namely, it contains multiple paths for each IP prefix. In particular, it
has been dumped the RIB of the rrc00 router3, dating back to February 1st,
2012: this router received 18 IPv4 full Internet tables from 28 active peers,
totaling about 7 millions of routes, with the related AS-path attribute. Fig-
ure 3.4 shows the distribution of AS-path lengths, where the maximum
AS-path length was 13 (without prepend). Please note that the figure does
not consider prepending since both S-BGP and reBGP verify an AS in the
AS-path only once.
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Figure 3.4: Composition of the RIB table of the rrc00 RIPEncc router.
The equation suggest the memory requirements Q of the rrc00 RIB
table:
Q =
N
∑
i=1
|RIBi| · s(i) · sizeof(σ) (3.1)
where |RIBi| represents the number of entries of length i, N is the max
AS-path length, the value s(i) is the number of required signatures for a
2Please refer to http://www.ripe.net/ for more details.
3The rrc00 router is part of the Routing Information Services offered by the
RIPEncc(http://www.ripe.net/data-tools/stats/ris/)
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Memory requirement
Key Signature rrc00 RIB
(bits) (bytes) (MB)
S-BGP 1024 40 7984
reBGP 140 120 848
Table 3.1: Memory requirement comparison among S-BGP and reBGP.
prefix of length i and sizeof(σ) is the size in bytes of a single signature. In
particular, s(·) will be:
s(i) =
{
1 with aggregate signature
i otherwise
Consistently with equation 3.1, the memory requirements of the the
RIB of rrc00, is 7984 MB and 848 MB for S-BGP and reBGP respectively,
namely a reduction of 9,4 times. Memory requirements for the signatures
are summarized in Table 3.1.
Timestamp requirements
As seen, introducing the timestamps for every AS and for each pre-
fix in the RIB enables the possibility to revoke prefix and route endorse-
ments. Timestamps are a simple but effective mechanism that could also
be applied by other secure versions of BGP. This equation evaluate the
additional memory requirement T:
T =
N
∑
i=1
|RIBi| · i · sizeof(timestamp) (3.2)
Considering timestamps of 8 bytes, the additional overhead grows around
320 MB. Combining equation 3.1 and 3.2, the total memory requirement of
reBGP is 1168 MB, with a reduction of 6.8 times with respect to S-BGP.
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3.4.2 Computational complexity
To evaluate the overhead introduced by the cryptographic operations,
this dissertation considers a simple chain topology (Figure 3.5) of N Auto-
nomous Systems and estimates the time required to perform signatures
and verifications on all the nodes of the chain. In such topology, AS1 is the
IP1
IPn
Figure 3.5: Network topology used to estimate the computational over-
heads of reBGP.
source node, since it is the first node of the chain and is the only one that
owns and advertises some prefixes to the rest of the network. ASN is the
sink node, that is the last node of the chain: it only receives the advertised
prefixes from the preceding node, but does not forward any message. All
the other AS nodes are transit nodes, since they receive all the advertised
prefixes by the preceding node and forward them to the following node in
the chain.
Considering public key based BGP protocols (like S-BGP with DSA),
the transit nodes are the most overloaded, since they handle both sig-
nature verification and generation for any received prefix. On the other
hand, the source and the sink nodes only perform signatures generation
and verifications, respectively. Clearly, ASN−1 is the node with the max-
imum overhead, since it has to verify every advertised prefix with the
longest path and has to sign every prefix for ASN. For this reason, the
node in position (N − 1) is defined as critical node. As the above section,
according to [141], the maximum AS-path length is N = 13.
To evaluate the overhead required by the cryptographic operations of
the protocol reBGP, new software has been implemented using the PBC
Library of the Stanford University, [91], which is an experimental free C
library for elliptic curves arithmetic and pairing computation.
Since there is no publicly available version of S-BGP, its cryptographic
49
operations have been implemented using the OpenSSL Library, [111]. In
order to obtain a fair comparison, a non optimized version of the OpenSSL
library has been used. This fill the gap with the experimental grade of the
PBC library. The reported results were obtained using an Intel(R) Core i5
540m CPU at 2.53 GHz with 3072 KB of L2 cache and equipped with 4GB
of DDR3 memory and averaging the results of 100 experiments.
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative overhead of every AS in the simulated environ-
ment.
Figure 3.6 shows in µs the cumulative overhead (i.e. signature cost
plus verification cost) experienced by every AS along the chain topology.
For the same AS-path length, this experiments varied the number of NLRI
advertised by AS1, setting them to 2, 4 and 8. As expected, the overhead
introduced by S-BGP grows linearly, since it uses DSA: each transient node
has to verify and sign one time for every hop from the source node. reBGP,
instead, introduces always a constant overhead, regardless to the AS-path
length. Considering the lines of reBGP, it’s easy to note that the reBGP
overtakes S-BGP starting from an AS-path length equal to 4. Even if a sin-
gle pairing operation is more expensive than both a DSA verification and
DSA signature, the continuous growth of the AS-path quickly reduces this
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advantage and worsen the performances of S-BGP. It is worth noting that
from Figure 3.4 there are less than 3% of the announced routes have a path
length lower than 4. Furthermore, the more the AS-path length grows, the
more the advantage of reBGP over S-BGP increases. The resulted values
have been used as reference for the delays introduced in the SSFNet sim-
ulator to evaluate the convergence time of the routing information in the
network, as shown in the next section.
3.4.3 Convergence Time
The above computational overhead estimation provides a fundamental
analysis of the protocols. Since BGP is a distance vector protocol, exactly
a path vector protocol, each time a router handles a message the delay
introduced by the cryptographic operations would accumulate in time.
The delays, then, would broaden the time needed by the Internet to con-
verge, namely to reach a stable state in which each node (router) has the re-
quired information [60, 33, 79]. As other works, this dissertation presents
an analysis of the convergence time based on SSFNet, [137], namely, a tool
for scalable high-performance network modeling, simulation, and analy-
sis. It is a Java-based and event-driven simulation package able to model
large and complex networks, just like the Internet. The experiments used
SSFNet with networks of different sizes that exhibit the same properties of
Internet, [33, 51].
To evaluate protocol reBGP and propose a fair comparison with S-BGP
and simulate the effects of the cryptographic operations on the CPU, a
time delay for each message management has been added. The introduced
time delay were taken from the evaluation results of the computational
overhead analysis, as exposed in the above Section 3.4.2.
Before introducing experiments results, as observed in [60], it’s im-
portant to note that there are two primary causes of BGP delayed con-
vergence: the first concerns the distributed nature of BGP path selection;
the second relates to the Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI)
value, that is a timer that limits the minimum time interval between two
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consecutive update messages sent for the same destination. While the
main purpose of MRAI is to provide protection against route flapping
attacks, [143], one of the effects is the increase of the convergence time.
Furthermore, it allows a router to collect several UPDATEs before to send
a new UPDATE to the same peer.
In order to get rid of the effects of the MRAI, this value is set to 0, while
the suggested value is 30 seconds. The results show that the difference
between the convergence time of BGP and its secure versions is due only
to the introduced delays. The effects of MRAI, in fact, in the relatively
small networks simulated with SSFNet would completely hide the delays
of the cryptographic operations.
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Figure 3.7: Estimated convergence time of BGP, S-BGP and reBGP.
Figure 3.7 shows the impact of reBGP and S-BGP on the convergence
time with several network sizes. As said, the network topologies are part
of the SSFNet project and are publicly available. These topologies describe
networks with 29, 110, 208, 409, and 715 nodes (AS), in which the most
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relevant Internet graph properties are preserved, [33, 51]. Thanks to its
aggregate signatures, reBGP introduces smaller delays compared to S-BGP
when the path length is greater than 4 (see Section 3.4.2). In this way, the
total convergence time of reBGP is always smaller than the one of S-BGP.
Chapter 4
On the difficulty of Denial of
Service Attacks detection
This chapter shows the effectiveness of metrics based on information
theory and evaluates them using a huge data set of real network flows.
4.1 Background
One of the most critical aspect of DDoS (Denial of Service and Dis-
tributed DoS) attacks is their artlessness and simplicity.
While the synchronization of attacking entities is still performed us-
ing botnets of unaware compromised hosts, nowadays, simple word-of-
mouth ways are used to coordinate volunteers attackers (e.g., chat, twit-
ter, irc channels or others). Recently, one of the most used tool to perform
DDoS is “LOIC” (Low Orbit Ion Cannon), a software originally designed
to test the robustness of network services and able to quickly flood a tar-
get IP with connections. LOIC and similar tools make these activities ex-
ploitable by all Internet users: political hacktivists, individuals or interested
groups keep increasing their use to express disagreement against private
companies or public entities. Many examples can be found in the past
The work described in this chapter is a joint work with L.V.Mancini, A. Spognardi, A.
Villani and it appeared in the 9th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
(SECRYPT2012), [43].
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years [28]. For example, in September 2010, a DDoS attack named Op-
eration Payback was launched against the Motion Picture Association of
America’s (MPAA) web-page. Similarly, strong emphasis was given to the
series of DDoS attacks against several companies which resulted in a cut
off for WikiLeaks.org or to the Playstation’s online store as a form of re-
venge against Sony’s lawsuit against the PS3 hacker George Hotz. More
recently, DDoS attacks have been reported to the Italian Government, the
Vatican State web sites and many other international institutions. In gen-
eral, every Internet Critical Infrastructure or any sensitive economic ser-
vice can be considered a possible target.
The effects of DDoS attacks can be serious: in the best cases, the net-
work services hosted by the target Autonomous System become unavail-
able as long as the attack activity persists; in the worst cases, the session
between the target AS and its ISP breaks out, making a black hole where
the packets are all dropped, eventually causing a chain reaction that am-
plifies the attack and spreads its effect on other AS nodes. DDoS attacks
are considered really challenging and have generated a large amount of
research activity. In the last decade, several works try to survey met-
rics, strategies and tools to protect network services and to reduce the
impact of such malicious activities. At the same time, new attack flavors
(ip-spoofing, low-rate attacks, botnet and others) keep raising the level of
challenge.
Finally, privacy concerns and the lack of secure techniques to make
data anonymous, keep researchers unable to freely share their own traffic
datasets and network dumps, slowing and hindering the research on this
topic.
This chapter focuses on DoS and Distributed DoS attacks that consume
the bandwidth resources of a whole AS node. In the DDoS taxonomy de-
fined by Mirkovic et al., [101], such kind of attack has code VT-4, since
it generates an extremely large number of network flows, saturating all
the router resources (CPU or ram or bandwidth capacity) of the AS. In-
creasing router resources is typically helpless against bandwidth satura-
tion attacks, mainly for stub AS nodes: they usually purchase the minimal
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required bandwidth, but suffer DDoS attacks from intermediate AS nodes,
with much higher traffic capacity.
Typical defenses, usually adopted in stub AS nodes, avoid memory or
CPU saturation [37], but are typically helpless against bandwidth satura-
tion attacks: the high bandwidth pathways usually lie in the intermediate
networks, while the end networks purchase only as much bandwidth as
they usually need. A more effective solution is to block the malicious traf-
fic in advance, in the upper AS nodes, before it could reach the target AS.
The most used approach to distinguish malicious packets among the ag-
gregated traffic at AS level is the adoption of information theory metrics,
since they are able to make traffic anomalies to “emerge” from the whole
traffic flows. As it has been shown in section 2.2, the effectiveness of pro-
posed metrics is evaluated using synthetic traffic, where attack patterns
are artificially injected.
The experiments shown in this chapter are based on the collected traffic
that flowed through an important Italian Tier II AS, as shown in Figure 2.1,
that plays the role of transit for some stub AS node and shares connections
with other ISPs in a IXP (Internet eXchange Point). In order to protect cus-
tomers privacy, no references about real IP addresses, identities or related
contents are provided.
The collection probe recorded meaningful high resources network events
and several attacks; these events have been used to evaluate and estimate
the effectiveness of information theory metrics for DDoS attack detection,
just using CISCOTM NetFlow data set.
4.2 Entropy and Relative Entropy Metrics
The use of entropy analysis aims to capture fine-grained patterns in
traffic distributions, that simple volume based metrics cannot identify. In-
terestingly, information theory based metrics enable sophisticated anomaly
detections directly with the whole traffic that are difficult to provide with
simpler metrics, like aggregated traffic workload, number of packets or
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single host traffic. As it will be described in the next sections, the events
detected by combinatorial metrics are not really predominant when ob-
served with traditional ways: within the aggregated traffic of the moni-
tored ISP (order of 1Gbit/s), a DDoS attack against a single VLAN is not
noticeable, since the Mbits needed to perform a DDoS attack are well-
hidden in the aggregate traffic, and would not determine any apparent
anomaly. On the other hand, the Kullback-Leibler divergence is effectively
able to notice the anomaly and to raise an alarm. To provide the same
level of accuracy, any traditional metric should be continuously evaluated
on every possible target, in order to detect the anomalies. Combinatorial
metrics, instead, are able to detect the anomalies within the whole traffic;
moreover, those are less affected by the fluctuations of traffic workload or
any other quantitative measure.
The first metric evaluated is the simple entropy, that captures the de-
gree of dispersal/concentration of a distribution. Then, the experiments
consider two relative entropy measures, namely the Kullback Leibler diver-
gence [85] and Rényi divergence [86].
The concept of Entropy was introduced by Shannon in [133]. The classic
definition says that entropy is a measure of the uncertainty associated with
a random variable. The entropy H(X) of a discrete random variable X is
defined as:
H(X) = −∑
i
pi log2 pi (4.1)
where pi = P[X = i] is the probability that X assumes the value i.
Relative entropy (also known as information divergence) is a non sym-
metric measure of the similarity between two probability distributions P
and Q and quantifies the distance between two statistical objects. The
Kullback-Leibler divergence equation [85] used is:
DKL(P||Q) =∑
i
P(i)log
P(i)
Q(i)
(4.2)
A low DKL value means a high similarity in the two probability distribu-
tions, on the other hand, high divergence values correspond to low simi-
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larity. Note that, since it is not symmetric, the divergence measure can not
be strictly considered a metric (i.e., DKL(P||Q) 6= DKL(Q||P)).
The Rényi divergence generalizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence, pro-
viding a family of metrics based on a parameter α. Formally [86]:
Dα(P||Q) = 11− α log∑i
pαi
qα−1i
(4.3)
Notice that Dα→1(P||Q) = DKL(P||Q). Intuitively, Rényi divergence with
high values of α takes in higher account the more likely events, while with
low values of α, it considers more equally all the events, regardless of their
likelihood.
4.2.1 Metrics implementation
This section describes how to exploit netflow data to implement the
above-mentioned metrics. As stated by [109], port and IP address dis-
tributions are highly correlated in network traffic. For this reason, only
source and destination IP have been considered.
Network flows are aggregated into time blocks of a fixed size (1 minute
by default). Let f t be the number of flows that cross the monitored net-
work in a time block. Let f ti be the number of flows that have IPi as source
(or destination) address. For each time block t, the entropy is evaluated by
the following formula:
H(X) = − ∑
∀distinct IP i
f ti
f t
log2
f ti
f t
(4.4)
Concerning the relative entropy metrics (Kullback-Leibler and Rényi), pi
describes the packet distribution over a time block t, while qi describes the
packet distribution of the previous time block t− 1:
pi =
f ti
f t
, qi =
f t−1i
f t−1
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The Kullback-Leibler divergence is computed as follows:
DKL(t||t + 1) =∑
i
f ti
f t
log
f ti
f t
f t−1i
f t−1
=∑
i
f ti
f t
log
f ti f
t−1
f t f t−1i
and Rényi divergence as:
Dα(P||Q) = 11− α log
(
∑
i
(
f ti
f t )
α
(
f t−1i
f t−1 )
α−1
)
Notice that the experiments only consider the entries that appear in both
t and t − 1 time blocks, since the relative entropy imposes Q(i) > 0 for
each P(i) > 0. Another key aspect is the choice of the parameter α in
the Rényi divergence. According to the results in [86], the experiments set
the value of α to 5. The time block dimension affects the relationship be-
tween detection reactivity and detection sensibility, directly influencing the
results. This thesis assumes that 1 minute is a good compromise between
reactivity and sensibility.
4.3 Attack and anomaly analysis
This section reports the comparison of the three metrics presented in
the above section, applied to several anomalies collected in the monitored
network. Remember that the netflow dataset refers to the period between
September 2010 and August 2011, that has been the scenario for several
DDoS episodes, in Italy and abroad. In order to make a complete and fair
comparison between Entropy, Kullback-Leibler and Rényi metrics with
the previous research results, the experiments evaluated the above met-
rics considering separately the destination and the source IP distributions.
The experiments considered the whole dataset of netflows and are ba-
sed on the evaluation of the three metrics for all the 12 months. However,
since there is no complete knowledge of the attacks happened during the
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whole period, the evaluations only considered as attacks the official report
of the AS network administrators. As depicted in the next figures, the re-
ported anomalies correspond to metric fluctuations that produced peaks
in their values. Once such high peaks were identified, deeper inspection
was conducted in order to capture the motivations behind the anomaly.
This kind of analysis produced several insights about the behaviors and
limitations of the metrics.
In addition to the reported anomalies, this chapter analyzes another
kind of network activity, namely the abnormal traffic generated by sched-
uled and automated administration activities (e.g., scheduled backups or
maintenance procedures). Since those activities can make sensible service
outage to users, they are usually programmed in the period that spans
from 12:00am to 8:00am, when regular traffic is low and the amount of
flows reaches its minimum. By observing the relative netflows, it is possi-
ble to identify sudden and relatively short mutations of the traffic pattern,
resulting in a deep alteration of the metrics.
4.3.1 Sample events
This section reports the results of four sample events (E1, E2,E3, E4):
Table 4.1 summarizes how the implemented metrics (Entropy H, Kullback
Leibler KL and Rényi R) reacted during these events. The three metrics
are evaluated both on source and destination IP with the exception of the
Rényi divergence which is evaluated only on destination IP. The results
do not report the Rényi on source address due to its extremely fuzzy be-
havior. The shortened form Hs, KLs and Hd, KLd, Rd refer to entropy, Kull-
back Leibler and Rényi respectively evaluated on source and destination
IP distributions.
Table 4.1 reports how all metrics (the columns of the table) behave
when each event (the rows of table) happens. If an abrupt variation to
a higher value has been observed, the cell of the table says that the met-
ric Increases; in the opposite case, the cell says that the metric Decreases.
Finally, the Unvaried value indicates the absence of observable variation
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with.
E1 E2 E3 E4
(DoS) (DoS) (DDoS) (Routines)
KLd Increases Increases Increases Unvaried
Hd Decreases Decreases Decreases Increases
Rd Unvaried Unvaried Unvaried Unvaried
KLs Unvaried Increases Increases Unvaried
Hs Decreases Decreases Increases Decreases
Table 4.1: Malicious events and Denial of Service metrics behavior.
In order to avoid metrics overlapping, the results of the Entropy and
Kullback-Leibler with the source IP have been plotted mirrored with re-
spect to the x axis.
E1 — DoS attack This episode has been classified as a DoS attack. In
fact, traffic statistic (table 4.2) shows that there was a single IP playing a
primary role during the attack against one single host server. There were
also few other IP addresses participating to the attack, with a smaller con-
tribution.
Source Flows
IP1 40.6%
IP2 28.3%
IP3 8.8%
IP4 0.4%
IP5 0.3%
IP6 0.3%
IP7 0.1%
. . . . . .
Table 4.2: E1 - traffic statistics.
All the metrics correctly detected the malicious activity, as shown by
the fluctuations and the spikes of Figure 4.1. Indeed, Rényi distribution
shows the lower peak.
The DoS nature of the attack is well described by the downfall of both
entropy lines (in the lower part of the plot) around 4:00pm. This behavior
expresses that a small number of source addresses generates the largest
61
Figure 4.1: E1 — metrics comparison for a DoS attack.
amount of connections towards a small set of destinations, namely the
typical scenario of a DoS attack. At the same time, KL on destination IP
grows significantly. To have a deeper insight of KL behaviors, the graphs
plot the contribution of every destination IP to the final KLs and KLd val-
ues. The Figure 4.2 (upper) reports the first ten time-blocks since the be-
ginning of the malicious activity. It is evident how the final value of KLd
is obtained by the contribution of one main component (the victim host),
while the contribution of the other hosts is negligible. On the other hand,
since during a DoS attack, only few sources generate the largest part of the
traffic, each attacking host addresses many flows towards the victim host.
This anomaly is perfectly captured by the peaks of lower Figure 4.2, that
corresponds to the main contributors to the KLs value.
In the same plot of Figure 4.1, it is possible to observe the anomaly de-
scribed as administration activity (maintenance jobs) and labeled with E4:
before 7:00AM indeed both source and destination entropy metrics rise
and fall continuously, since they generate maximum (respectively mini-
mum) traffic compared to high (respectively low) traffic.
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Figure 4.2: Kullback-Leibler details for E1 on source and destination IP
address.
E2 — DoS attack In this episode, the main contribution to the attack
comes from a single IP, and it consists in more than 50% of all the flows
towards one single victim host; moreover, the five most active IPs have
generated the 93.8% of the whole traffic (table 4.3).
In this event, the victim host does not involve a large portion of net-
work flows, while several other services of the networks (web, mail, DNS
servers etc.) generated the larger amount of flows. Nevertheless, the traf-
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Source Flows
IP1 58.7%
IP2 13.0%
IP3 12.8%
IP4 7.0%
IP5 2.3%
IP6 0.4%
IP7 0.2%
IP8 0.1%
. . . . . .
Table 4.3: E2 - Traffic statistics.
fic diversity expressed when the attack occurred has been well detected
by both KL measures. This aspect represents a scalability factor of this
measure and suggests that the attack is detectable among the whole aggre-
gated traffic: the attack emerges from the traffic thanks to its informational
fingerprint. As entropy line shows (Figure 4.3), the attack starts soon after
1:00PM.
Figure 4.3: E2 — metrics evaluations for a DoS attack.
The entropy on both attributes decreases, representing a non-uniform
distribution of destination IP as well as source IP fields. The Rényi dis-
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tribution reveals a small peak, but this is hidden by the fuzzy behavior it
exhibits.
Even in this case it is possible to observe the perturbations due to the main-
tenance jobs: in the case of the entropy, the peaks are higher than the ones
relative to the attack E2, generating some false positive (as it will be clear
in the following). Rényi divergence also suffers the same issue.
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
-1
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
t e
r m
s
 o
f  
t h
e
 s
u
m
 (
K
L
)
destination IP
time block
(60 seconds)
t e
r m
s
 o
f  
t h
e
 s
u
m
 (
K
L
)
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
-0.2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1.2
 1.4
 1.6
t e
r m
s
 o
f  
t h
e
 s
u
m
 (
K
L
)
source IP
time block
(60 seconds)
t e
r m
s
 o
f  
t h
e
 s
u
m
 (
K
L
)
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
Figure 4.4: Kullback Leibler details for E2, on source and destination IP
address.
In this particular DoS attack, the intensity of malicious traffic is sig-
nificantly lower than E1, making the detection more difficult. Indeed, the
entropy peaks associated to the attack are not really evident since they are
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lower than the false positive of the early morning; nevertheless, the KL is
still able to detect the anomaly. Again, the deeper representations of the
KL contributors at the time of the attack (Figure 4.4) show how this metric
correctly reveals the attack and characterizes it as a DoS.
E3 — DDoS attack This event describes a Distributed DoS attack, char-
acterized by a large number of attack sources. In this event the most ac-
tive host generates only the 0.5% of the flows in the aggregated traffic (ta-
ble 4.4).
Source Flows
IP1 0.5 %
IP2 0.5 %
IP3 0.3 %
IP4 0.2 %
IP5 0.1 %
IP6 0.1 %
IP7 0.1 %
. . . . . .
Table 4.4: E3 - Traffic statistics.
This kind of attack is really different from E1, where the most active IP
addresses generate about half of total flows.
Figure 4.5 reports the metric behavior. As in E1, Rényi distribution
seems to generate several peaks associated to non-attack instances. The
most significant example can be found around 6:00PM. The attack started
soon after 10:00PM: both entropy metrics reveal the event and catch its
DDoS nature. The abrupt growth of source IP entropy line suggests that
there was a great amount of diversity in this field. The peak of destination
IP entropy represents that there is an anomalous variation in the connected
endpoints.
Attack dynamic is represented in upper Figure 4.6, where the rough-
ness and quickness of the malicious event causes a jump of the KL value.
The presence of several new entities drawn by the DDoS attack induces
a continuous variation in the source IP distribution (see lower Figure 4.6)
and, then, causes the KL to fluctuate constantly. As opposite to previous
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Figure 4.5: E3 — metrics evaluations for a Distributed DoS attack.
cases, the plot shows that the variation of the KL metric is caused by mul-
tiple components, that contribute to its final value.
E4 — Maintenance jobs In order to explore how entropy metrics are
prone to false positive (see introduction of Section 4.3.1), a deep analysis of
maintenance job events has been performed. These events are common to
all networks, and consist in backup activities scheduled during the early
hours of each days, aimed to reduce network workload and service degra-
dation. Figure 4.7 shows how each IP contributes to the final KL value. The
component’s order of magnitude is clearly smaller than the other KL de-
tailed graphs. KL values, as well as the values of entropy metrics, are sen-
sible to traffic variation. Since the entropy metrics sense destinations (re-
spectively sources) IP addresses distribution diversity, they notice a lacks
of regularity in the traffic flows and increase their values. On the oppo-
site, KL values warns distributions divergence, but the low level of traffic
activity attenuates the final result, keeping the value of the metric below
suspicious value.
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Figure 4.6: Kullback Leibler details for E3 on source and destination IP
address.
4.3.2 Metrics comparison
The experiments show that all the aforementioned metrics are able to
detect the traffic alterations, but some of them are prone to a high false
positive rate. In particular, it is easy to observe that the Rényi is the more
unstable metric: it exhibits many spikes during the whole analysis, mak-
ing very unsuitable its use for DDoS anomaly detection with netflows.
Similarly, the Entropy metric shows many fluctuations, making difficult
to find a feature related to DDoS attacks. The Kullback-Leibler (KL), in-
stead, seems to have the more stable trend, showing evident spikes only
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Figure 4.7: E4 — metrics evaluations for maintenance jobs.
during the attack events. According to other studies like [150], the results
showed in this dissertation also suggests that the KL is the most suitable
information theory metric to detect DDoS.
Furthermore, it is relevant to highlight the difficulty to define a thresh-
old value that could be used to determine if a spike corresponds to an at-
tack or not. Threshold selection is easier with simple metrics (like packet
number or packet size), but it seems much harder with statistical metrics
[23, 129]. Both the Entropy and Rényi metrics show very unstable val-
ues and, in coincidence with some known attacks (like E2 and E3), exhibit
lower values than the ones obtained during the regular traffic.
Chapter 5
Obfuscation of Sensitive Data in
Network Flows
This chapter describes (k, j)-obfuscation, a novel obfuscation technique
that provides formal guarantees of security and privacy.
5.1 A novel technique: (k, j)-obfuscation defense
As anticipated in Section 2.3, techniques based on a one-to-one map-
ping of each IP address in an encrypted value that is consistent across the
whole data set are ineffective when an adversary gets to know the mapping
among some IP addresses and their encrypted value.
On the other hand, mapping the same IP address to different encrypted
values in different flows would effectively counteract those attacks, but
would result in an excessive loss of information; i.e., it would be tanta-
mount to suppress the IP address fields from released flows. This Chapter
exposes a novel technique, named (k, j)-obfuscation, that enforces a many-
to-one mapping among IP addresses and pseudo-random group-ID val-
ues, which are substituted in obfuscated flows to the real IP addresses.
The work described in this chapter is a joint work with D.Riboni, A. Villani, D.Vitali,
C. Bettini and L.V.Mancini; it appeared in the 31st Annual IEEE International Conference
on Computer Communications (IEEE INFOCOM 2012) [41].
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With this solution, each IP address in the released flows is blurred in a set
of at least k possible IP addresses.
Note that, with the above solution, an adversary may still be able to
identify the real IP address in the group of possible addresses based on
the fingerprint of its host. For this reason, (k, j)-obfuscation technique
includes a defense against fingerprinting attacks. At first, IP addresses
are grouped based on the fingerprint of their corresponding host: IP ad-
dresses whose hosts have similar fingerprint are grouped together. Then,
the fp-QI values of flows are obfuscated, such that, for each obfuscated
flow f ∗ whose source IP s belongs to an IP-group α, there exist other j ≤ k
obfuscated flows, whose source IP belongs to α but is different from s,
and that are fp-indistinguishable from f ∗. This way, even if the adversary
knows the hosts’ fingerprint, as well as the mapping among IP addresses
and group-IDs, he cannot associate each flow to less than j different IP
addresses.
5.1.1 Network flows obfuscation
Let be L an original set of network flows, and by L∗ the obfuscated
version of L released by the data publisher. The fields of the flows include
a confidential multi-value attribute Ap = {src_addr,dst_addr}, and a set
of other fields Ai = {A1, A2, . . . , Am} that may be used to infer Ap. In
particular, as explained in Section 2.3, some flow fields may be exploited
to identify Ap based on the hosts’ characteristics. In order to characterize
those fields, consider the notion of fingerprint Quasi Identifier (fp-QI).
Definition 1 (Fingerprint Quasi Identifier (fp-QI)) A field of a network flow
is denoted as a fingerprint Quasi Identifier (fp-QI) if its value, possibly com-
bined with external knowledge about the characteristics of the network hosts, can
reduce the cardinality of the candidate set for source or destination IP addresses
of the flow in L∗.
Clearly, which flow fields act as fp-QI strongly depends on the external
knowledge available to the adversary. In order to state that two flows are
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indistinguishable based on the network hosts’ fingerprint, consider the
following notion.
Definition 2 (Fingerprint indistinguishability) Two network flows are fp—
indistinguishable if their fp-QI values are identical.
Given a flow f , and fields A, f [A] is the projection of f onto A; for
instance, f [src_addr,source_port] is the pair 〈source IP address, source port〉
of f . Flows are obfuscated by a defense function D() before being released.
Definition 3 ((k, j)-obfuscation function) Let us consider D : L×N×N→
L∗ a partial function that transforms a set of network flows by substituting each
IP address with a group-ID, and by possibly obfuscating the values of the other
fields of the flows. Each IP address is mapped to its IP-group by a function group-
ID; this mapping is consistent across the whole set of flows. Let be f ∗ ∈ L∗ the
transformation of f ∈ L obtained by the application of function D. D is a (k, j)-
obfuscation function if, for each set L of network flows, L∗ = D(L, k, j) satisfies
the following properties:
• p1: Each IP-group contains at least k different IP addresses. Formally, for
each group-ID g appearing in a flow f ∗ ∈ L∗, there exists a set A of at
least k IP addresses appearing in a flow in L such that, for each a ∈ A,
group-ID(a) = g.
• p2: Each flow f ∗ is fp-indistinguishable in a set of at least j flows in L∗
originated by distinct IP addresses belonging to the same IP-group.
D(L, k, j) is undefined if the above properties cannot be satisfied; i.e., if L
involves less that k different IP addresses (it is impossible to enforce p1), or if L
contains less than j flows (it is impossible to enforce p2).
Table 5.1 reports a summary of the notation used in this chapter.
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Table 5.1: Summary of the notation used for the (k, j)-obfuscation algo-
rithm.
fp-QI fingerprint Quasi Identifier (Definition 1)
src_addr, dst_addr fields for source and destination IP
f [A] projection of flow f onto field A
L (respectively L∗) original (respectively obfuscated) set of network flows
D(L, k, j) (k, j)-obfuscation function (Definition 3)
k minimum number of IP addresses in a group
j minimum number of fp-indistinguishable flows
τ time granularity used in Algorithm 3
5.1.2 Adversary model
At each release of a set L∗, the goal of an adversary is to reconstruct,
with a certain degree of confidence, the source and destination IP ad-
dresses of flows in L∗. The considered adversary model is based on the
following assumptions:
1. The adversary may observe L∗.
2. The obfuscation function D() is publicly known.
3. The adversary may have external information about the characteris-
tics of the target environment, including the fingerprint of network
hosts. For example, the adversary may know the topology of the net-
work to be logged, and the set of services offered by its hosts. This
knowledge determines which fields act as fp-QI.
4. The adversary may know in advance where and when the flows will
be collected, and may inject flows into the network.
Note that this thesis assumes a powerful adversary, that may perform
both fingerprinting and injection attacks. Those assumptions are reason-
able. Indeed, some information about the logged network and hosts can be
acquired after the release of flows; for instance, by scanning the network to
locate services. Moreover, in some cases (e.g., if logs are periodically col-
lected and released from a given network), an adversary may also know
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in advance the network location and the schedules of flows collection, and
send bogus messages to target hosts in the network.
5.1.3 Confidentiality guarantees
As explained in Section 2.3, most network flow anonymization tech-
niques (e.g., Crypto-PAN [52]) are based on a function that maps the space
of real IP addresses into a separate space, in order to avoid the disclosure
of the real source/destination IPs of the flows. However, it has been recog-
nized that other fields in the flows may allow an adversary to reconstruct
the real source/destination IPs of some flows, thus violating privacy con-
straints. For this reason, several frameworks have been recently proposed
to counteract the re-identification of IPs, by obfuscating (i.e., generalizing,
substituting, randomizing, . . . ) the values of those fields. However, it was
shown – both theoretically [13] and empirically [18] – that the existing ob-
fuscation methods can be easily defeated by injecting flows in the network
according to complex patterns.
The strategy (k, j)-obfuscation is based on the pragmatic assumption
that, in the worst case, an adversary may be able to reconstruct the map-
ping among some IP addresses and their pseudo-ID value by injection at-
tacks1, and he may know the accurate fingerprint of some network hosts.
In the following section, the confidentiality guarantees enforced by
(k, j)-obfuscation will be described, based on different assumptions about
the external knowledge available to an adversary.
Defense against knowledge of the IP mapping function
As explained in Section 2.3, if an adversary discovers a mapping be-
tween the real and obfuscated IP address in one flow, and the IP address
encryption is consistent across the whole set of flows, he can decrypt the
same IP in any other flow in which it appears: such mappings can be easily
1Even (k, j)-obfuscation does not provide any defense method specifically tailored
against injection attacks, its defense against fingerprinting attacks – which is based on
generalization – may effectively counteract injection attacks as well.
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discovered through injection. As demonstrated by the following theorem,
(k, j)-obfuscation counteracts this attack, by ensuring that no less than k
different IP addresses are mapped to the same IP-group.
Theorem 1 Consider a (k, j)-obfuscation function D, a set L of original network
flows, its obfuscated version L∗ = D(L, k, j), and an obfuscated flow f ∗ ∈ L∗.
Suppose that the (obfuscated) source and destination IP addresses of f ∗ are α and
β, respectively. Suppose also that an adversary got to know the function that
maps original IP addresses to their group-IDs. Then, based on the knowledge of
that function, he can associate the source and destination IP addresses of f to no
less than k(k− 1) different pairs of possible addresses.
Proof According to the property p1 of (k, j)-obfuscation, the cardinality of
groups α and β is greater than or equal to k. There are two possible cases:
either α is different from β, or α is equal to β. In both cases, the uncertainty
of the adversary about the original source IP of f is at least k: indeed, at
least k original IPs may have been substituted with group-ID α in f ∗. If
β is different from α, the uncertainty of the adversary about the original
destination IP of f is also greater than or equal to k: hence, he can associate
the pair 〈src_addr, dst_addr〉 of f to no less than k2 different pairs of original
IPs. However, if β is equal to α, the uncertainty of the adversary about the
original destination IP of f is lower. Indeed, the adversary can exclude
that the same IP is both the source and destination of the flow, since flows
produced and designated to the same host are not logged by the network
flow collectors considered in this work. Hence, his uncertainty about the
original destination IP is greater than or equal to k− 1. As a consequence,
he can associate 〈src_addr, dst_addr〉 of f to no less than k(k− 1) different
pairs of original IPs.
Defense against fingerprinting attacks
If an adversary knows the fingerprint of network hosts, he can de-
crease his uncertainty about the source IP of a flow. The following the-
orem demonstrates that the (k, j)-obfuscation technique protects against
fingerprinting attacks.
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Theorem 2 Consider a (k, j)-obfuscation function D, a set L of original network
flows, its obfuscated version L∗ = D(L, k, j), and an obfuscated flow f ∗ ∈ L∗.
Suppose that an adversary has accurate information about the hosts’ fingerprint.
Then, based on this knowledge, he can associate the source IP address of f to no
less than j possible addresses.
Proof According to property p2 of (k, j)-obfuscation, f ∗ is fp-indistinguish-
able in a set F∗ ⊆ L∗ of j or more flows having different original source
IPs. This means that there exist at least j different hosts, which gener-
ated a flow that (after obfuscation) is equal to f ∗ based on fp-QI values.
Hence, exploiting fingerprint knowledge, the adversary cannot associate
the source IP of f to less than j different IPs.
Defense against combined attacks
A more powerful threat to consider is when an adversary knows both
the IP mapping function, and the hosts’ fingerprint. The following theo-
rem demonstrates that (k, j)-obfuscation provides strong protection even
under this assumption.
Theorem 3 Consider a (k, j)-obfuscation function D, a set L of original network
flows, its obfuscated version L∗ = D(L, k, j), and an obfuscated flow f ∗ ∈ L∗.
Suppose that the (obfuscated) source and destination IP addresses of f ∗ are α
and β, respectively. Suppose also that an adversary got to know the function
that maps original IP addresses to their group-IDs, and has accurate information
about the fingerprint of network hosts. Then, based on this information, he can
associate each pair 〈src_addr, dst_addr〉 to no less than j(k− 1) different pairs
of possible addresses.
Proof In order to prove this theorem, let us refer to the proofs of Theo-
rems 1 and 2. Let us consider the source IP. As shown in the proof of The-
orem 1, by exploiting only the knowledge of the function mapping original
IPs in group-IDs, an adversary cannot associate the original source IP of
f to less than k different IPs; i.e., the ones that are mapped to α by that
function (let be A this set of possible IPs). On the other hand, as shown
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in the proof of Theorem 2, by exploiting only fingerprint knowledge, an
adversary cannot associate the source IP to less than j ≤ k possible IPs
(let be B this set of possible IPs). In order to restrict the candidate set of
possible IPs, the adversary may intersect A and B. However, property p2
of (k, j)-obfuscation ensures that all the IPs in B are mapped to the same
IP-group; since the source IP of f is mapped to α, this means that also the
other IPs in B are mapped to α. Hence, B is a subset of A, and, as a con-
sequence, the intersection of A and B equals to B. Because the cardinality
of B is greater than or equal to j, the adversary can associate the source IP
of f to no less than j different possible IPs. Since, as shown in the proof of
Theorem 1, the uncertainty about the original destination IP of f is greater
than or equal to k− 1, it follows that the adversary cannot associate each
pair 〈src_addr, dst_addr〉 to less than j(k− 1) different pairs of original IPs.
Defense against linking attacks
In some cases, an adversary may be able to understand that a flow
g∗ is the response to a flow f ∗. Different inferences may be used to link
request and responses; for instance, by observing that a flow from α to β
is immediately followed by a flow from β to α. The following theorem
demonstrates that (k, j)-obfuscation is effective even against this kind of
inferences.
Theorem 4 Consider a (k, j)-obfuscation function D, a set L of original network
flows, its obfuscated version L∗ = D(L, k, j), and two obfuscated flows f ∗ ∈ L∗
and g∗ ∈ L∗. Suppose that the adversary got to know that g∗ is the response to
f ∗. Suppose also that he knows the function that maps original IP addresses to
their group-IDs, and has accurate information about the fingerprint of network
hosts. Then, based on this information, he can associate the source/destination IP
addresses of f and g to no less than j(j− 1) different pairs of possible addresses.
Proof Since the adversary knows that g∗ is the response to f ∗, he knows
that the source IP of f is equal to the destination IP of g, and vice-versa.
As shown in Theorem 3, he can perform a combined attack to restrict the
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Figure 5.1: Overview of the (k, j)-obfuscation method.
candidate set of source IPs of f to a set A having cardinality greater than
or equal to j. He can perform the same attack to restrict the candidate set
of source IPs of g to a set B having cardinality greater than or equal to j.
Hence, he cannot associate the source/destination IPs of f and g to less
than j2 different pairs of original IPs. Moreover, if the source/destination
IPs of f and g are mapped to the same pseudo-ID, the set of candidate
source/destination IPs is smaller: its cardinality is j(j − 1) (the proof is
analogous to the one of Theorem 1).
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Input: L: original set of network flows; fp-QI: set of fingerprint Quasi
Identifiers; k: minimum group size; j: minimum number of
fp-indistinguishable flows; τ: time granularity for enforcing
fp-indistinguishability.
Output: L∗: set of obfuscated network flows.
Obfuscate(L, fp-QI, k, j, τ) begin1
IP-groups G; IP-group identifiers GID := GroupCreation(L, fp-QI, k)2
L := SubstituteIPs(L, G, GID)3
L∗ := ∅4
foreach IP-group Gα ∈ G do5
Lα := GetFlows(L, Gα)6
L∗α := Bucketize(Lα, fp-QI, j, τ)7
L∗ := L∗ ∪ L∗α8
end9
return L∗10
end11
Algorithm 1: Network flow obfuscation algorithm.
5.2 Enforcing (k, j)-obfuscation
Finding the optimal transformation of flows that satisfies (k, j)-obfus-
cation (i.e., the one that minimizes the generalization of fp-QI values, and
the suppression of flows) is a NP-hard problem; indeed, it is well-known
that even the basic problem of optimal k-anonymous generalization is NP-
hard [100]. For this reason, (k, j)-obfuscation is an approximate algorithm;
its pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 1. At first (line 2), IP-groups are
created by executing Algorithm 2 (Section 5.2.1). Then (line 3), the real
IPs in network flows are substituted by the identifier of the IP-group they
belong to. After initializing the set of obfuscated flows L∗ (line 4), for
each IP-group, flows generated by the hosts of its IPs are considered, then
the fp-indistinguishability property is enforced by executing Algorithm 3
(Section 5.2.2), and it adds the obfuscated flows to L∗ (lines 5 to 9). Finally
(line 10), the set of obfuscated flows are returned.
79
Input: L: original set of network flows; fp-QI: set of fingerprint Quasi
Identifiers; k: minimum group size.
Output: IP-groups: G1, . . . , Gj; IP-groups identifiers: GID1, . . . , GIDj.
GroupCreation(L, fp-QI, k) begin1
set of IP addresses A := { f [src_addr], f ∈ L} ∪ { f [dst_addr], f ∈ L}2
if |A| < k then return null3
foreach IP address a ∈ A do4
foreach feature ∈ fp-QI do5
feature value v f := GetFeatureValue(L, a, feature)6
fingerprint feature vector −→a := AddFeature(−→a , v f )7
end8
Hilbert index aH := ComputeHilbertIndex(
−→a )9
end10
sorted list of IP addresses
−→
A := SortOnHilbertIndex(A)11
group index j := 012
for i := 1 to |A| do13
if (i % k) = 1 then14
if (i + k) < |A| then15
j := j + 116
IP-group Gj := ∅17
IP-group identifier GIDj := CSPRNG()18
end19
end20
Gj := Gj ∪−→A i21
end22
return G1, . . . , Gj; GID1, . . . , GIDj23
end24
Algorithm 2: Fingerprint-based group creation.
5.2.1 Fingerprint-based IP-groups creation
The goal of the fingerprint-based IP-groups creation method is to en-
force property p1 of (k, j)-obfuscation while preserving the quality of ob-
fuscated data. In order to reach this goal, IP-groups are created by group-
ing together IPs whose hosts have a similar fingerprint (i.e., they originate
similar flows), so that fp-indistinguishability can be more easily enforced.
The algorithm to group IPs takes as input the original set L of network
flows, the set fp-QI of fingerprint Quasi Identifiers, and the minimum
group size k. It returns the IP-groups and their identifiers. The pseudo-
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code of the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2; its main operations are the
following:
1. If less than k IPs appear as source of a network flow in the original
set L, it is impossible to create an IP-group of size greater than or
equal to k. Hence, in this case, (k, j)-obfuscation cannot be enforced,
and the algorithm terminates (line 3 in Algorithm 2).
2. Otherwise, for each IP, the algorithm builds a fingerprint vector (lines
5 to 8), in which each dimension corresponds to a statistics (mean,
standard deviation, . . . ) about the values of an fp-QI field of its flows.
This vector represents the fingerprint of the host having that source
IP.
3. the algorithm maps each fingerprint vector in an integer value by ex-
ploiting the Hilbert space-filling curves [20] (line 9). A Hilbert space-
filling curve is a function that maps a point in a multi-dimensional
space into an integer. With this technique, two points that are close in
the multi-dimensional space are also close, with high probability, in
the one-dimensional space obtained by the Hilbert transformation.
In this case, IPs whose hosts have a similar fingerprint are associated
to close Hilbert indices.
4. the algorithm sorts IPs based on their Hilbert index (line 11), and cre-
ate groups by partitioning IPs in groups of size k based on that order
(lines 12 to 22); if the last group contains less than k IPs, it is merged
with the previous one. Each group is identified by a value calcu-
lated by a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number gener-
ator (CSPRNG) function (line 18). Finally (line 23), it returns the IP-
groups G1, . . . , Gj, as well as their identifiers GID1, . . . , GIDj.
5.2.2 Enforcing fp-indistinguishability
While the fingerprint-based group creation makes it difficult for an ad-
versary to associate flows to IPs in a group based on their fingerprint, it
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does not provide any formal privacy guarantee. Indeed, it is still possible
that an IP whose host has a very specific fingerprint can be distinguished
from the other ones in the same group, and correctly associated by an ad-
versary to its flows. We protect against these attacks by generalizing fp-QI
values; i.e., values of those fields that may be exploited by an adversary to
identify the source/destination IP of the flow based on the hosts’ finger-
print.
The (k, j)-obfuscation defense ensures that, for each obfuscated flow
f ∗ ∈ L∗, whose source IP is s ∈ α, there exist at least other j ≤ k flows
in L∗ whose source IP is s′ 6= s, s′ ∈ α, that are fp-indistinguishable from
f ∗. When the above condition is satisfied, each flow f ∗ can be associated
to at least j different source IPs with the same confidence: indeed, there
exist at least other j − 1 source IPs other than s, which generated a flow
indistinguishable from f ∗ based on fp-QI values.
Example 1 The obfuscation method is graphically illustrated in Figure 5.1. As
it can be seen, both source IPs of original flows f and g belong to group α; hence,
α is substituted to the real source IPs in obfuscated flows f ∗ and g∗. Moreover,
the values of fp-QI fields are generalized such that they assume the same values in
both f ∗ and g∗ (i.e., f ∗[fp-QI] = g∗[fp-QI]). Hence, an adversary performing a
fingerprinting attack cannot understand whether f ∗ has source IP A and g∗ has
source IP C or vice-versa.
The bucketization the values of fp-QI fields enforces the fp-indistin-
guishability property. Bucketization consists in substituting the real value
of a field with a multi-set of possible values. For instance, to make fp-in-
distinguishable a set of three flows whose number of bytes are 250, 400,
and 250, respectively, It substitutes the real values in these flows with
{250, 250, 400}.
The bucketization algorithm considers one group of IPs at a time. It
takes as input a set Lα of original flows (whose source IPs belong to the
same group α), the set of fp-QI fields, the minimum number j of fp-indis-
tinguishable flows, and a time granule τ (for instance, one minute). The
algorithm considers flows in slots of one time granule at a time, in order
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Input: Lα: original set of network flows whose source IP belongs to
IP-group α; fp-QI: set of fp-QI fields; j: minimum number of
fp-indistinguishable flows; τ: time granularity.
Output: L∗α: obfuscated flows.
Bucketize(Lα, fp-QI, j, τ) begin1
tstart := lowest timestamp of flows in Lα2
tend := highest timestamp of flows in Lα3
repeat4
foreach flow f ∈ Lα s.t. f [timestamp] ∈ [tstart, tstart + τ) do5
fp-QI feature vector
−→
f = f [fp-QI]6
Hilbert index fH := ComputeHilbertIndex(
−→
f )7
sorted list of flows
−→
F := SortOnHilbertIndex(Lα,τ)8
end9
group index i := 110
group of IPs Gi := ∅11
number of distinct IPs in Gi n := 012
for c := 1 to |Lα,τ| do13
if (@ f ∈ Gi s.t. f [src_addr] = −→Fc [src_addr]) then14
n := n + 115
end16
Gi := Gi ∪ {−→Fc }17
if (n = j) then i := i + 1; Gi := ∅; n := 018
end19
if (0 < n < j) then20
if i > 1 then Gi−1 := Gi−1 ∪ Gi; Gi := ∅21
else SuppressFlows(Gi)22
end23
L∗α,τ := ∅24
foreach group of flows G do25
G∗ := BucketizeFp-QI-values(G)26
L∗α,τ := L∗α,τ ∪ G∗27
end28
tstart := tstart + τ29
until tstart > tend30
return L∗α,τ31
end32
Algorithm 3: Bucketization of fp-QI fields.
to reduce computational and memory costs. This solution is needed when
very large sets of flows are considered, as it does in experimental evalua-
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tion. The algorithm returns the set of obfuscated flows L∗α. Its pseudo-code
is shown in Algorithm 3; the main steps are the following:
1. At first, it initializes two variables tstart and tend with the lowest and
highest timestamp of flows in L∗α, respectively (lines 2 and 3).
2. For each flow f in the original set having source IP belonging to
group α and timestamp in the interval [tstart, tstart + τ), it builds a
fp-QI feature vector
−→
f , in which each dimension corresponds to the
value of an fp-QI field of the flow (line 6). Algorithm maps each
fp-QI feature vector in an integer value fH by exploiting the Hilbert
space-filling curves (line 7), and sort the flows based on their Hilbert
index (line 8).
3. It partitions flows in groups based on their Hilbert order, ensuring
that each group contains at least j flows having distinct source IPs
(lines 10 to 19). If the diversity of source IPs in the last group is less
than j, then it merge them with the second-last group (line 21). If
diversity cannot be enforced, these flows are suppressed (line 22).
4. For each group, it substitute the fp-QI values of their flows with
buckets including the fp-QI values of each flow (lines 25 to 28). the
above steps is repeated, for the subsequent time intervals, until tend
is reached. Finally, the set L∗α of obfuscated flows is returned (line
31).
5.2.3 Correctness and computational complexity
Due to the typically large dimension of network flow datasets, the de-
fense algorithm needs to have low computational complexity. The most
computationally expensive task of the algorithm is sorting, which is per-
formed both for grouping IP addresses, and for bucketizing fp-QI fields
(complexity in the average case is O(n log n), where n is the maximum be-
tween the number of IP addresses appearing in the flows and the number
of flows to be made fp-indistinguishable). The calculation of the Hilbert
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index is an O(1) operation; it is executed (n + m) times, where n is the
number of flows, and m is the number of distinct IP addresses appearing
in flows.
Theorem 5 Algorithm 1 correctly computes a (k, j)-obfuscation function.
Proof In order to prove the correctness of (k, j)-obfuscation algorithm, it
must be demonstrated that, for each set L of original flows, fp-QI fields, k
and j parameters, the algorithm returns a set L∗ of obfuscated flows that
satisfy properties p1 and p2 of (k, j)-obfuscation (Definition 3). The above
statements can be easily proved by construction. Property p1 is enforced
by Algorithm 2. Note that, if less than k IP addresses appear in the set of
network flows, it is impossible to create an IP-group of size greater than
or equal to k. In this case, the algorithm terminates without obfuscating
flows. However, this situation is unlikely to occur, since logs of network
flows typically involve thousands, if not millions, of different IP addresses.
Property p2 is enforced by Algorithm 3.
5.3 Experimental evaluation
The goal of the experiments was to evaluate the role of (k, j)-obfusca-
tion parameters on the utility of obfuscated Netflows. Of course, higher
values of k and j determine stronger confidentiality protection but lower
utility of obfuscated flows.
5.3.1 Experimental setup
The experiments are supported by the real network data described in
Section 2.5. The Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 have been implemented using C
and Python programming languages. Experiments were carried out on a
workstation with IA64 Core i7 930, 2.80 GHz CPU (4 cores, 8 threads), and
12 GBytes DDR3 1066MHz of RAM, running a GNU/Linux kernel 2.6.32
OS. With this experimental setup, the software were able to obfuscate Net-
flows collected during an entire working day in a few hours. This is an
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acceptable time, since, for most applications, Netflow obfuscation can be
performed off-line. An extension of the algorithms to support larger sets
of Netflows will be investigated in future works. These experiments con-
sider a model in which the adversary may have an in-depth knowledge
of the network hosts’ fingerprint. This experiments assume that the fp-QI
fields of Netflows are: type of service (tos), protocol, TCP flags, number of
packets, and dimension in Bytes.
5.3.2 Impact of parameter k: IP address grouping
The first set of experiments was aimed at evaluating the role of pa-
rameter k of (k, j)-obfuscation; i.e., the minimum dimension of IP address
groups. In order to study the effect of k in isolation, Algorithm 2 has been
applied to the original set of Netflows in order to partition IP addresses in
groups of dimension greater than or equal to k. Then, each real IP address
in original Netflows has been substituted with its corresponding group-
ID. The value of k determines the level of obfuscation of IP addresses. Due
to the high complexity of the optimal algorithm for (k, j)-obfuscation, and
the very large size of the dataset, there are no comparison of (k, j)-obfus-
cation algorithm with the performance of the optimal one. Instead, the ex-
periments study the impact of (k, j)-obfuscation defense algorithm on ob-
fuscated Netflows using an information theory perspective; in particular,
the experiments measure the network flows entropy. Indeed, the network
flows entropy evaluation is widespread in traffic analysis, for instance, for
traffic anomaly detection [61], and traffic classification [156].
The experiments consider the distribution of IP addresses in flows col-
lected during one-minute long time windows, in order to evaluate its tem-
poral trend, both in original and in obfuscated flows. High values of
entropy are correlated to high diversity of the IP address distribution of
flows. Hence, this measure is important for network analysis: for instance,
a distributed denial of service attack would determine low entropy on des-
tination IP addresses (many flows are directed to the same host), and high
entropy on source IP addresses (many different hosts are performing the
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Figure 5.2: Entropy of source IP addresses distribution during one hour.
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Figure 5.3: Entropy of destination IP addresses distribution during one
hour.
attack). Figure 5.2 shows the result during a representative peak hour for
Internet traffic (from noon to 1 PM), using the dataset of about 7.5 million
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Figure 5.4: Entropy of source IP addresses distribution during 8 days.
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Figure 5.5: Entropy of destination IP addresses distribution during 8 days.
Netflows that were collected by the monitored network described in 2.5.
Similar results have been obtained considering other time intervals; for the
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sake of readability, figure 5.2 shows a one-hour sample. The experiments
include the IP address grouping algorithm with values of k ranging from
5 to 20. As expected, the average value of entropy is inversely correlated
to the value of k: indeed, the more IP addresses are grouped together, the
less diverse the traffic and, consequently, the lower the entropy. However,
algorithms for traffic analysis rely on fluctuations of the entropy value; not
on its absolute value. For instance, in [61], traffic anomalies are detected
by comparing the entropy in a fine-grained time window (e.g., from 12:00
to 12:01 of the current day) with its expected value (e.g., the entropy calcu-
lated on the same minute during multiple days). As it can be seen from fig-
ure 5.2, trends and temporal patterns are preserved by the transformation
of real source IP addresses in group-IDs; analogous results have been ob-
tained considering destination IP addresses. The above experiments have
been repeated considering the distribution of destination IP addresses, ob-
taining analogous results, which are shown in Figure 5.3. These results
were confirmed also considering the distribution of IP addresses in the
dataset of about 790 million Netflows collected during 8 consecutive days;
results are illustrated in figures 5.4 and 5.5.
The above results indicate that (k, j)-obfuscation technique for IP ad-
dress grouping preserves both traffic diversity and data utility for algo-
rithms based on information theory measures. For the following experi-
ments, the value of k has been fixed to 10, since it provides a good tradeoff
between confidentiality protection and data utility.
5.3.3 Impact of parameter j: fp-indistinguishability
The second set of experiments was aimed at evaluating the impact of
parameter j on the data quality of obfuscated Netflows. As explained in
Section 5.2, in order to reduce computational and memory costs, the algo-
rithm to enforce fp-indistinguishability takes a temporal granularity τ as
an additional parameter: Netflows are processed by Algorithm 3 in slots of
one time granule at a time. Using shorter time granules demands for less
computational and memory resources. However, in some cases, fp-indis-
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Figure 5.6: Suppressed flows (k = 10).
tinguishability cannot be enforced, since there is no sufficient diversity of
IP addresses in flows generated during a single time granule. In those un-
fortunate cases, the algorithm suppresses those flows that cannot be made
fp-indistinguishable.
The experiments include also the evaluations of the number of sup-
pressed flows, using different values of j (from 2 to 7) and τ (from one
minute to 32 minutes). The computational power of the experimental en-
vironment, limit the use the use of values of τ with one hour. As it can
be seen in figure 5.6, with low values of j (less than 5), the percentage of
suppressed flows rapidly decreases; it is close to zero with τ equal to 32
minutes. On the contrary, with higher values of j, a relevant fraction of
flows (> 20%) is suppressed. However, with k = 10, small values of j are
sufficient to provide confidentiality protection. Figure 5.7 reports the ad-
versary’s confidence based on the attacks considered in Section 5.1.3. As
it can be observed, with j = 4, the confidence of the adversary about the
association between a flow and its source and destination IP addresses is
below 10%.
The following experiments evaluate the utility of obfuscated Netflows
in terms of the precision in answering aggregate queries. For those fields
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Figure 5.7: Adversary’s confidence based on different attacks (k = 10).
having numerical domains (number of bytes and number of packets), other
experiments executed the queries considering ranges of different selectiv-
ity: e.g., “count the number of Netflows at minute t whose number of packets is
between 200 and 300”. Each queries have been performed considering each
interval of dimension 100 (for the number of bytes) and 5 (for the number
of packets), starting from 0, until the maximum dimension of bytes and
packets in the dataset of Netflows. For those fields having non-numerical
domains (tos, protocol, and TCP flags), the queries have been executed on
their specific values; e.g., “count the number of Netflows at minute t whose pro-
tocol is TCP”. Summarizing, all the experiments include queries for each
possible value/range, and for each minute in a one-hour time window,
for a total of about 120, 000 queries. Each query has been evaluated by the
error rate described by the following formula:
e =
∣∣ r
t − r
′
t′
∣∣
r
t
where r (respectively r′) is the result of the query on the original (respec-
tively obfuscated) flows, and t (respectively t′) is the total number of orig-
inal (respectively obfuscated) flows.
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(a) Protocol field query results
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(b) Flag field query results
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(c) Tos field query results
Figure 5.8: Average error rate for aggregate queries on obfuscated Net-
flows (k = 10).
Figure 5.8 shows the average error rate for different values of j and τ,
and the different fp-QI fields having non-numerical domains. Consider-
ing flag and protocol fields, with j equal to 4 or less, and τ equal to 16
minutes or more, the average error is below 10%. The average error rate
was even smaller with queries on numerical fields (results are shown in
Figure 5.9). The tos field presents the larger average error; however, even
with that field, the error becomes low using τ = 32 minutes and j ≤ 4. The
average error increases considerably when larger values of j are used; this
is due to the large number of flows that must be suppressed to achieve
fp-indistinguishability.
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(a) Query on byte field
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(b) Query on packet field
Figure 5.9: Average error rate for aggregate queries on obfuscated Net-
flows (k = 10).
Chapter 6
Data leakage in Machine
Learning models
This chapter evidences a new kind of information leakage in the model
of the Machine Learning algorithms.
6.1 Background
Machine learning classifiers are designed to make effective and effi-
cient prediction of “patterns” from large data sets. Many applications
have been proposed in the literature, e.g.: [49, 97, 140, 106, 29, 40, 104],
and machine learning algorithms pervade several contexts of information
technology. ML approaches (such as Support Vector machines, Clustering,
Bayesian network, Hidden Markov models, etc.) rely on quite distinct
mathematical concepts but generally they are employed to solve similar
problems. A machine learning algorithm consists of two phases: train-
ing and classification. During the training, the ML algorithm is fed with a
training set of samples. In this phase, the relationships and the correlations
implied in the training samples are gathered inside the model. Afterwards,
the model is used during the classification phase to classify and evaluate
The work described in this chapter is a joint work with G. Ateniese, L.V.Mancini, A.
Spognardi and A. Villani and it has been submitted for publication, [56].
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new data.
ML classifiers are usually able to manage a large amount of data and to
adapt to dynamic environments. Their versatility makes them suitable for
several important tasks. For example, classification and regression models
are employed to analyze current and historical trends to make predictions
in financial markets [36, 65, 119], to study biological problems [140], to
support medical diagnosis [63, 88, 146], to classify network traffic or detect
anomalies [26, 50, 75, 99, 104, 106].
One may think that it is safe to release a classifier, both in hardware
or software, since intellectual property laws would prevent anyone from
producing a similar apparatus, for example, by copying its code or de-
sign principles. However, releasing a trained classifier may be subject to
unexpected information leakages that make it possible to produce a com-
petitive product without violating any intellectual property rights.
Let us consider, for instance, a classifier Ca that is less effective than a
classifier Cb produced by a competitor. The ML algorithms used in Cb
may be publicly available or be inferred through reverse engineering. For
example, commercial software products for speech recognition, such as
Nuance Dragon Naturally Speaking [108], utilize widely studied Hidden
Markov Models. These algorithms, along with their optimizations, are
well-understood and quite standard. Thus, the common assumption is
that anyone can easily replicate them. In particular, it could be assumed
that the training set used for Cb is superior, in the sense that makes Cb more
effective than Ca even though both implement essentially the same ML al-
gorithms. What makes Cb better than Ca is the specific knowledge formed
during the training phase, inferred by the training set. For instance, a clas-
sifier that makes stock market predictions based on neural network holds
its power in the weights at its hidden layer (see Section 6.2.1). But those
weights depend exclusively on the training set, hence valuable informa-
tion that must be treasured.
Thus, it is fair to ask: Is it safe to release a profitable ML classifier?
Would selling a software/hardware classifier reveal concrete hints about
its training set, uncovering the secrets of its effectiveness and jeopardizing
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the vendor?
This chapter shows that a classifier can be hacked and that it is possi-
ble to extract from it meaningful information about its training set. This
can be accomplished because a typical ML classifier learns by changing
its internal structure to absorb the information contained in the training
data. In particular, this chapter proposes an attacks that build and train a
meta-classifier that can successfully detect and classify these changes and
deduce valuable information. However, it could not report on products
released by commercial vendors since the missing of the legal permission
to hack a proprietary product. Nevertheless, the experiments proposed
in this chapter analyzed the same ML algorithms employed by commer-
cial products. For example, experiments consider the HMM-based speech
recognition engine of the open-source package VoxForge which is similar
to the ones employed by commercial products, such as Nuance Dragon
Naturally Speaking. Furthermore, using open-source software makes the
experiments easily reproducible by others.
It is important to observe that this study is not interested in privacy
leaks, but rather on discovering anything that makes classifiers better than
others. In fact, the attack do not care about protecting the elements of
the training set. Consider the following example: a speech recognition
software recognizes spoken words better than competing products, even
though they all implement the same ML algorithms. The training set is
composed of commonly spoken words, thus it does not make sense to talk
about privacy protection. However, it shows how to build a meta-classifier
trained to reveal that, for instance, the majority of training samples came
from female voices or from voices of people with marked accents (e.g.,
Indian, British, American, etc.). Then, we can extrapolate certain hidden
attributes which are somehow absorbed by the learning algorithm, thus
possibly uncovering the secret recipe that makes the speech recognition
software stay ahead of the competition.
Therefore the type of leakage focused in this dissertation is quite dif-
ferent than that considered in privacy preserving data mining and statis-
tical databases [1, 24] or differential privacy [9, 44]. Indeed, section 6.4
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shows that a system providing Differential Privacy is utterly insecure in
the model considered in this dissertation.
6.2 Hacking Machine Learning classifiers
This section focus on Machine Learning algorithms used for classifi-
cation purposes, such as Internet traffic classifiers and speech recognition
systems, or for financial market predictions. The goal is to hack a trained
classifier to obtain information that was implicitly absorbed from the ele-
ments the classifier received as input.
6.2.1 Artificial Neural Networks
The Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are a category of machine learn-
ing algorithms able to solve a variety of problems in decision making, op-
timization, prediction, and control, learning functions from real, discrete
and vector valued examples. The ANNs obtain good performances in
problems where the training data is retrieved by complex sensors, such
as cameras or microphones. These algorithms are also resilient to the
presence of noise in the dataset. Several types of ANN have been pro-
posed [69], but this thesis will focus on a particular family of ANNs, the
ones based on Multilayer Perceptrons, and the related Backpropagation algo-
rithm , [25], used for their training.
The basic unit of an ANN is the Perceptron (or neuron), a unit that takes
a vector of real-valued inputs, calculates a linear combination of these in-
puts and then outputs 1 if the result is greater than some threshold and -1
otherwise. More formally a perceptron can be represented as a function
o(x1, . . . , xn) =
{
1 if ∑ni=0 wixi > 0
−1 otherwise
where let be x0 always set to 1 to simplify the notation, and let be net =
∑ni=1 wixi. Observe that −w0 is the threshold value that makes the neuron
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to output 1.
A single perceptron represents an hyperplane decision surface in the n−
dimensional space of instances. This kind of perceptron can only discrimi-
nate between linearly separable instances. To overcome this limitation, the
sigmoid function σ is used to decide the output value:
σ(net) =
1
1− expnet
An ANN is a multi-layer network of neurons: a first input layer receives
the input bits and provides modified inputs to a following layer, that, in
turn, elaborates them and feeds a new layer, and so on. The last layer out-
puts the result of the ANN. The neurons that form the internal layers are
called the hidden units. The core function of the network resides in the
weight of the hidden units in the internal layers which are set through the
backpropagation algorithm. Starting from random weights, the algorithm
tunes them using a training set of input-output pairs: the inputs go for-
ward to the network until they become output, while the errors (namely,
the difference between actual and expected outputs) are back-propagated
to correct the weights. The error is reduced iteratively until a minimal and
tolerable error is obtained. The backpropagation of the error is inspired by
the principle of gradient descent: in a nutshell, if the weight significantly
contributes to the error then its adjustment will be greater.
Let’s now consider a simple neural network that has to learn the iden-
tity function over a vector of eight bits, only one of them set to 1 (this exam-
ple is taken from the popular book of Mitchell, [102]). The network has a
fixed structure with eight input neurons, three hidden units and eight out-
put neurons. Using the backpropagation algorithm over the eight possible
input sequences, the network eventually learns the target function. By ex-
amining the weights of the three hidden units, it is possible to observe
how they actually encode (in binary) eight distinct values, namely all pos-
sible sequences over three bits (000, 001, 010, . . . , 111). The exact values of
the hidden units for one typical run of the backpropagation algorithm are
shown in Table 6.1.
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Input Hidden Values Output
10000000 → .89 .04 .08 → 10000000
01000000 → .15 .99 .99 → 01000000
00100000 → .01 .97 .27 → 00100000
00010000 → .99 .97 .71 → 00010000
00001000 → .03 .05 .02 → 00001000
00000100 → .01 .11 .88 → 00000100
00000010 → .80 .01 .98 → 00000010
00000001 → .60 .94 .01 → 00000001
Table 6.1: The weights of the hidden states, taken from Figure 4.7 of [102].
Basically, the hidden units of the network were able to capture the es-
sential information from the eight inputs, automatically discovering a way
to represent the inputs. Thus, it is possible to extract the (possibly sensi-
tive) cardinality of the training set by just looking at the trained network.
6.2.2 Classification and Regression Trees
A classification or regression tree (introduce by Breiman et al. in [12] in
1984) are a prediction model which maps observations in a decision tree.
The observations L = (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xN, yN) constitute the train-
ing set and are used to learn a decision tree. Both classification and regres-
sion trees deal with the prediction of a response variable y (let Y be the
domain of y), given the values of a vector of predictor variables x (let X be
the domain of x). If y is a continuous or discrete variable taking real values
(e.g., the size of an object, the number of occurrences of certain events), the
problem is called regression; if Y is a finite set of unordered values (e.g., the
type of Iris plants), the problem is called classification.
The training phase produces a tree structure in which the leaves repre-
sent the class labels and the branches represent conjunctions of features that
lead to the class labels of their leaves. Decision trees can be considered
as disjunction of conjunctions of constraints on the attribute-values of in-
stances. Each path from the tree root to a leaf corresponds to a conjunc-
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tion of attribute tests, and the tree itself to a disjunction of these conjunc-
tions, [102]. Decision trees work better when the target function has dis-
crete output (for example “yes or no”) and the data instances are repre-
sented by attribute-value pairs. Furthermore, decision trees perform well
even when the training dataset contains errors or missing values. These
characteristics make decision tree a suitable solution for many classifica-
tion problems and in a great variety of contexts. For example, in [40] au-
thors propose an Online Voltage Security assessment scheme for energy
distribution management which uses decision trees algorithm to avoid the
voltage collapse, hence, a possible large scale blackout. In the context of
computer and networking security, Edith et al. in [29] proposed a packet
classification for large ISP networks, in [104] authors propose and evalu-
ate an intrusion detection system that uses decision trees and SVM also.
Podgorelec et al [120], proposes decision tree models in medical decision
processes, such as diagnosis of orthopedic fractures, myocardial infarction
as well as a strategy of mass vaccination. While these examples show the
large flexibility of decision trees, they also highlight the importance of in-
vestigating possible information leakages from such models.
The most popular implementation of decision trees is the C4.5 algo-
rithm, which is an extended version of the ID3 algorithm, both proposed
by Quinlan, respectively, in 1986 [121] and 1993 [122]. These algorithms
employ a top-down, greedy search through the space of all possible de-
cision trees. In detail, ID3 algorithm starts the search of the decision tree
answering the question: which attribute should be used at the root of the tree?
Once the root is found, a descendant node of the root is created for each
possible value, then the same question is asked recursively at each new
node, until: (i) each attribute has been considered in the path through the
tree, or (ii) the training examples related to a specific leaf has the same at-
tribute values. The selection of the best attribute in each level of the tree
is performed using the concept of information gain. In fact, the information
gain measures how well a given attribute separates the training examples.
Given a collection S of items, for each attribute A, ID3 algorithm evaluates
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the gain of A with respect to S via the equation:
Gain(S, A) = H(S)− ∑
v∈Values(A)
|Sv|
|S| H(Sv)
where H(S) represents the Entropy of the entire dataset and Sv is the sub-
set of S for which attribute A has value v. Roughly speaking, this measure
represents the expected reduction in entropy caused by partitioning the
training set using the attribute under analysis.
ID3 algorithm performs an inductive learning method since it progres-
sively searches for the decision tree that fits the training examples (the hy-
pothesis space is the set of all possible decision trees). This search strategy
has several effects: (i) it inhibits ID3 in finding alternative decision trees
that coherently match the same training set and, (ii) it converges to locally
optimal solution.
The Information leakages of the decision tree models can be easily de-
tected. Figure 6.1 shows the model obtained by the training phase of the
ID3 algorithm, using the Weka Framework, [145], and the Iris plants data
set. The Iris dataset is perhaps the best known database in Machine Learn-
ing literature. The data set contains 3 classes of 50 instances each, where
each class refers to a type of Iris plant (Setosa, Versicolour and Virginica).
One class is linearly separable from the other 2; the latter are not linearly
separable from each other. It is publicly available form the UC Irvine web-
site [55].
petal width <= 0.6 Setosa (50.0)
petal width > 0.6
| petal width <= 1.7
| | petal length <= 4.9 Versicolour (48.0/1.0)
| | petal length > 4.9
| | | petal width <= 1.5 Virginica (3.0)
| | | petal width > 1.5 Versicolour (3.0/1.0)
| petal width > 1.7 Virginica (46.0/1.0)
Figure 6.1: Decision tree model obtained using Weka Framework, C4.5
algorithm and Iris plants dataset.
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As it can be observed in the figure, decision tree algorithms produce a
plain-text model, in which many of the characteristics of the used dataset
are straightforwardly visible.
Although the Iris Datasets is quite simple and small, the above exam-
ple is very useful to highlight some concerns. In fact, relevant features of
the data set quickly stand out: in the training set no Iris Setosa plant with
petal width greater than 0.6 centimeters can be found, while similar consid-
erations can be made for Virginica and Versicolour plants. Moreover, other
information leakage can be directly obtained, such as the size and the re-
lation between the model classes. In fact, the number in brackets shows
how many true positive and false positive instances of the training set were
involved during the training phase. Similarly, it is possible to see the de-
gree of separation between the different classes of instances: in the above
example, the Setosa class is clearly independent from the others, while, on
the other hand, Virginica and Versicolour classes have examples that share
some attribute values (e.g., petal width). Also, notice how this kind of infor-
mation can be inferred even if the true positive and false positive values
were not included into the tree.
As a consequence, it’s worth to note that in the case of this classifier,
relevant information on the characteristics of the training data is already
contained in the model; actually, this is a distinctive feature of all models
that are expressed in a sort of plain-text form.
6.2.3 An attack strategy
This section devises a general attack strategy against a trained classi-
fier that can make an attacker able to discover some statistical information
about the training set.
Let be the training datasetD a multi-set where all the elements are couples
of the form {(~a, l)|~a = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉}; to simplify, let assume without loss
of generality that ai ∈ {0, 1}m, and l ∈ {0, 1}ν. Each training element~a is
represented as a vector of n features (the values ai of the vector) and has
an associated classification label l. C is a generic machine learning classi-
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Figure 6.2: Attack methodology.
fier trained on D: it could be an Artificial Neural Network (ANN), a Hidden
Markov Model (HMM) or a simple Decision Tree (DT).
Let assume that C is disclosed after the end of the training phase. This
means that the adversary cannot taint C during the learning process. In-
stead, the adversary is able to arbitrarily modify the behavior of C during
the classification process. In fact, when C is disclosed, it includes the set
of instructions for the classification task as well as the model definition;
hence, both the data structures and the instruction sequences are com-
pletely in the hand of the adversary. The assumption that the adversary
has complete access to the classifier is reasonable since it is possible to
extract the plain classifier also from a binary executable through, for in-
stance, dynamic analysis techniques, e.g.: [157].
Each classifier C can be encoded in a set of feature vectors that can be
used as input to train a meta-classifierMC. The set of feature vectors that
represents C are denoted by FC . For example, in the case of an SVM, the
set FC would contain the list of all the support vectors of the classifier C.
In Figure 6.2, Cx is the trained classifier that the adversary wants to
examine in order to infer some statistical information about the training
set Dx. Let P be the property that the adversary wants to learn about the
undisclosed Dx. Let use P ≈ D to say that the property P is preserved
by the dataset D. For instance, in the context of medical diagnosis appli-
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Input:
~D: the array of training sets
~l: the array of labels, where each li ∈ {P,P}
Output: The meta-classifierMC
TrainMC(~D,~l)1
begin2
DC = {∅}3
foreach Di ∈ ~D do4
Ci ← train(Di)5
FCi ← getFeatureVectors(Ci)6
foreach~a ∈ FCi do7
DC = DC ∪ {~a, li}8
end9
end10
MC← train(DC)11
returnMC12
end13
Algorithm 4: Training of the meta-classifier.
cations, P could be: the entries of the training set are equally balanced between
males and females. To discern whether P ≈ Dx, the adversary can build a
meta-classifier MC, that is a classifier trained over a particular dataset DC
composed of the elements ~a ∈ FCi labeled with l ∈ {P,P}. The label is
assigned according to the nature of the dataset used to train the classifier
Ci.
To train MC the adversary has to build the training set first. For this
purpose, the adversary generates ~D = (D1, . . . ,Dn), a vector of specific
datasets in such way that ~D contains a (possibly) balanced amount of in-
stances reflecting P and P. After this step, he trains the meta-classifier
MC as described in Algorithm 4. The algorithm takes as input the created
training sets ~D and their corresponding labels. It starts with an empty data
set (line 3). Then, it trains a classifier Ci on each created data set (line 5)
and gets the representation of the classifier as a set of feature vectors (line
6). Then, it adds each feature vector to the dataset DC (line 8). Finally, it
trains the meta-classifier using the resulting data set DC (line 11).
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Next, the adversary uses the meta-classifierMC onFCx to predict which
class lx the classifier Cx belongs to. This is already a new form of informa-
tion leakage since the adversary learns whether the original training data
Dx preserves P or not.
It is important to remark that with this methodology the adversary ex-
tracts external information, not in the form of attributes of the dataset Dx.
These are essentially statistical properties inferred from the relationship
among dataset entries. For example, Section 6.3.1 shows how to attack a
speech recognition classifier by extracting information about the accent of
the speakers. This information is not supposed to be captured explicitly
by the model nor it is an attribute of the training set.
To further improve the quality of the classification process, some filters
can be applied to the set DC of models resulting from the training phase.
The filters depend on the problem domain and are used to find optimal
models for the property P and get rid of less significant entries. In some
cases (as the example in Section 6.3.2), this step can be simply assimilated
into the training phase of the meta-classifier. For example, section 6.3.1
will discuss a filter realized with the Kullback-Leibler divergence [92].
6.3 Case studies
This section provides two examples of attacks performed according
with the methodology introduced in Section 6.2.3. These case studies
probe two complex systems, one of which is largely used by software ven-
dors and research communities. As first example, the focus of the attack
is a Speech Recognition system realized by Hidden Markov Models; later,
a network traffic classifier implemented by Support Vector Machines has
been considered. The experiments are performed using Weka [145].
In each experiment, the meta-classifier MC is the Decision Tree Classifier
(more details on Decision Tree are reported in 6.2.2); the experiment uses
the C4.5’s implementation, namely J48 module, included within the Weka
framework. Clearly, the attack could be replicated using meta-classifiers
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based on other ML algorithms.
The evaluation of the experiments is performed using standard met-
rics: (1) recall, that is the true positive rate, and (2) precision, that is the ratio
of true positive and the total number of positive predictions of the model.
Furthermore, (3) accuracy, namely the rate of correct predictions made by
the classifier over the number of instances of the entire data set, can be
easily derived from the confusion matrices in Sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2.
6.3.1 Hidden Markov Models
Background
A Markov Model is a stochastic process that can be represented as a fi-
nite state machine in which the transition probability depends only on the
current state and is independent from any prior (and future) state of the
process. An Hidden Markov Model, introduced in [4], is a particular type
of Markov Model for modeling sequences that can be characterized by an
underlying process generating an observable sequence. Indeed, only the
outputs of the states are observed (the actual sequence of the states of the
process cannot be directly observed). One of the most elegant examples to
describe HMMs was conceived by Jason Eisner [47]: During the year 2799,
contemplate studying the weather in Baltimore (Maryland) for the sum-
mer of 2007 by considering the number of ice creams Jason ate every day
during that summer. Only using this record (the observable sequence), is
it possible to estimate with a good approximation the daily temperature
(the hidden sequence). HMMs solve the sequential learning problem that is
a special learning problem where the data domain is sequential by its na-
ture (e.g., speech recognition problem). In Figure 6.3, a simple model M is
represented that can be described by:
• a set of hidden states Q = q1, q2, ..., qm
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Figure 6.3: An example of Hidden Markov Model with three states..
• a transition probability matrix
A =

a11 a12 . . . a1m
a21 a22 . . . a2m
...
... . . .
...

where the element ai,j represents the probability of moving from
state i to state j
• an emission probability matrix B(m × n), where the element bj,k is
the probability to produce the observable ok from the state j, that is
bj,k = Bj(k) = P(ok|qj)
The HMM model is based on two main assumptions. The first is the
Markov assumption, namely that given a sequence x1, . . . , xi−1 of tran-
sitions between states, the probability of the next state depends only on
the present state:
P(xi = qj|x1, x2, . . . , xi−1) = P(xi = qj|xi−1)
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The second is the output independence assumption, namely that given a
sequence x1, . . . , xT of transitions between states, where xi = qj, and the
observed sequence y1, . . . , yT, the emission probability of any observable
ok depends only on the present state and not on any other state or observ-
able:
P(yi = ok|x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xT, y1, . . . , yT) = P(ok|qj)
In Figure 6.3, three states (q1, q2 and q3) are shown: the transition prob-
abilities aij, and, for the three states, the emission probabilities (B1, B2, B3
respectively) of the three observable (o1, o2, o3).
The HMM models are well suited to solve three types of problems: like-
lihood, decoding and learning, e.g.: [72]. Likelihood problems are related
to evaluating the probability of observing a given observable sequence
y1, . . . , yT, given a complete HMM model, where both matrices A and B
are known. Decoding problems call for the evaluation of the best sequence
of hidden states x1, . . . , xT that can have produced a given observable se-
quence y1, . . . , yT.
Learning problems consist of reconstructing the two matrices A and B
of an HMM, given the set of states Q and one (or more) observation se-
quence Y. When used for learning, the well-known Viterbi algorithm is em-
ployed to train the HMM. This algorithm exploits dynamic programming
techniques and trellis graphs to provide an efficient way to find the most
likely sequence of states generating a given observation sequence. For the
training phase, all the transitions and emission probabilities are incremen-
tally adjusted in order to obtain the most probable model. The standard
algorithm to perform this task is the Baum-Welch algorithm, which derives
the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters of the HMM, given a data
set of observation sequences.
Exploring the details of these algorithms is out of the scope of this
work, but for the sake of completeness it’s worth to report that the classi-
fication problem in the context of HMM is reduced to finding the solution
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to the following system:
arg max
X
{
ax(0),x(1)
T
∏
t=1
ax(t),x(t+1)bx(t)(ot)
}
where X is a specific state sequence of the model.
HMM for speech recognition
This section describes the attack to the HMM in the specific case of
Speech Recognition Engines (SRE). The Speech Recognition (SR) is the pro-
cess of converting a sound recorded through an acquisition hardware to
a sequence of written words. The applications of SR are manifold: dicta-
tion, voice search, hands-free command execution, audio archive search-
ing and so on; the predominant technology used to perform this task is the
HMM [71], many tools are nowadays available, [81, 82].
The experiment exploited methodology described in 6.2.3 to verify whe-
ther the HMM was trained with a biased training set: according to the
methodology described in 6.2.3, it is possible to detect, with high confi-
dence, whether the HMM was trained only with people with the same
accent.
There exist several types of speech recognition engines. Some con-
sider each word simply as a sequence of phonemes ignoring the context in
which a phoneme appears; others try to obtain a more accurate detection,
by taking into account also the probabilities that a particular sequences
of phonemes can appear in the target language. One of the main reasons
that makes this process challenging is that there are many variations for
the same word depending on the speaker or the environment. For in-
stance, pronunciation, speed of speaking, or characteristics of the acquisi-
tion hardware can generate many perturbations to the signal associated to
the same spoken utterance.
To recognize a speech, SREs require two types of input:
• an Acoustic Model, which is created by taking speech audio files, i.e.,
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the speech corpus, and their transcriptions, and combing them into a
statistical representation of the sounds that make up each word;
• and either a Language Model or a Grammar File. Both describe the
set of words that the statistical model will be able to classify. How-
ever, the first model contains the probabilities of sequences of words,
while the second contains a set of predefined combinations of words.
For the sake of the experiment, it uses only the Language Model.
The SRE workflow is the following. An unknown speech waveform
is captured by the acquisition hardware, the Pulse Code Modulation pro-
vides the digital representation of the analogical audio signal. This bit
stream is now converted in mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs), na-
mely a representation of the short-term power spectrum of sounds. The
MFCCs are the observables of a Hidden Markov Model that changes state
over time and that generates one (or more) observables once it enters into a
new state.
In this scenario, the states of the HMM are all the possible sub phones
of the language while the transition matrix contains the probability for
each sub phone to cycle over itself or to move to the next sub phone. The
emission probabilities are the probability to observe a certain MFCC from
each sub phone. The only possible transitions between the states of each
phones are to themselves or to successive states, in a left-to-right fashion;
the self-loops makes it possible to deal with the variable length of each
phone with ease. Both transition and emission probabilities are built using
the Viterbi algorithm, [64], over a large speech corpus.
Since the MFCC files are vectors of real-valued numbers, they are ap-
proximated by the multivaried Gaussian distribution (note that the proba-
bility to have exactly the same vector would be nearly 0). For any different
state (i.e., sub phone), each dimension of the vector has a certain mean and
variance that represent the likelihood of an individual acoustic observation
from that state.
For the sake of the experiments, it has been built an Hidden Markov
Models using the Hidden Markov Model Toolkit (HTK), [155]. HTK consists
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of a set of library modules and tools available in C. The HTK toolkit pro-
vides a high level of modularity and is organized through a set of libraries
with functions (e.g., HMem for memory management, HSigP for signal
processing ,. . . ) and a small core.
The MFCC files were gathered from the VoxForge project [144], the
most important speech corpus and acoustic model repository for open-
source speech recognition engines. Moreover, each speech file released by
VoxForge is associated with several categories such as gender, age range,
and pronunciation dialect. The aim of the experiment is to extract this in-
formation, which is implicitly correlated with the contents, even if it does
not appear as an attribute in our data set.
Attack description
The main objective of this attack is to build a meta-classifier for the fol-
lowing property P: the classifier was trained only with people who speak an
Indian English dialect. It’s important to emphasize that this is external in-
formation as introduced in Section 6.2.3: the speech dialect is not explicitly
used during the training process, but in practice it influences the output of
the classifier.
The first part of the experiment describes the encoding of the HMMs;
next, it describes the decision tree of the meta-classifier; finally, it presents
an improved version of the classifier that uses a filter to improve the clas-
sification.
To carry out the attack, the experiments retrieved 11, 137 recordings
from the VoxForge corpus. In particular, the experiments consider only
the MFCC files in the English language. Each track comes with a form con-
taining some meta-information (e.g., gender, age, pronunciation dialect).
The corpus have been partitioned according to this meta-information, na-
mely by the same pronunciation dialect. Starting from this partition, it has
been created ~D according to the rule defined in Section 6.2.3. Then, each
classifier Ci have been trained as described in Algorithm 4.
Each classifier Ci, is represented in the HTK toolkit by an ASCII file
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containing an HMM for each phoneme belonging to the English language.
Each HMM is composed of: a transition probability matrix A(n× n)which
describes the transition between hidden states and the two vectors M =
(µ1, µ2, . . . , µm) and V = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σm) that are respectively mean and
variance of the output probability distribution from a given hidden state
(see Sections 6.3.1). The experiments took the default HTK values (i.e.,
m = 25 and n = 5). To encode a single HMM, it is suffice to choose
to focus only on the output distributions, that is, the couple of vectors
(M, V). The idea is that all these values are initialized in the early steps of
the training, according to a mean computed over the entire MFCC dataset:
since all the values are iteratively refined through the HTK toolkit, then it
could happen that these values are correlated in some way with the voices
of the learning set and, by extension, with the pronunciation dialects. For
this reason, the feature vector~a ∈ FC are:
~a = (ph, µ1, µ2, . . . , µm, σ1, σ2, . . . , σm, li)
where ph is a string value representing a phoneme, µ1, µ2, . . . , µm and
σ1, σ2, . . . , σm are the output probability vectors and li ∈ {Indian,not Indian}
is the label of the current row. It is important to notice that this encoding
gives a row in DC for each phoneme of the acoustic model. The training
set was composed of 5, 420 tuples equally balanced over the two classifica-
tions considered for this experiment. The test set was composed of 1, 016
instances: 774 of these are classified as not Indian and the remaining 242
are classified as Indian. The training ended up with a very complex meta-
classifier: the decision tree was composed of more than 811 nodes with
610 leaves.
Indian not Indian classified as
220 22 Indian
72 702 not Indian
Table 6.2: Speech recognition attack: the confusion matrix of the meta-
classifier.
Table 6.2 reports the confusion matrix obtained from this experiment;
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in fact, the confusion matrix shows how correctly a classifier assigned the
labels to the elements of the input set. The not Indian classifiers are cor-
rectly classified with precision of 0.97 whereas the Indian classifiers are
recognized with precision 0.75. Specifically, recall of Indian class equals
0.909 and recall of not Indian equals 0.907.
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Figure 6.4: Speech recognition attack: frequency of the values of σ2 for all
phonemes in the training data of the meta-classifier.
One of the most interesting feature provided by the C4.5 algorithm con-
sists of the order in which the attributes decision tree appear. In fact C4.5
puts the most representative attributes at the higher level of the tree. In the
experiment, one of the most representative node is σ2. The frequencies of
each value of σ2 in the training data of the meta-classifier are represented
in figure 6.4. It is easy to notice that the mean values of each distribution
are considerably shifted and can be easily recognized with respect to the
class. The meta-classifier is very effective in catching those differences;
hence, as the experiments show, it obtains very good performances.
To further improve the quality ofMC, a filter to the training set DC has
been applied. The goal was to extract the phonemes that better differentiate
the language dialect. To perform this task, the experiments employed the
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Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the output probability distribu-
tions of the models. The KL divergence is defined as follows:
DKL(P||Q) =∑
i
P(i)log
P(i)
Q(i)
(6.1)
A low DKL value means a high similarity of the two probability distribu-
tions, while on the other hand, high divergence values correspond to an
inferior similarity. This means that the phonemes with the highest diver-
gence are the ones which better discriminate the Indian accent from others.
Since the output probabilities follow a Normal distribution, the KL diver-
gence is computed with the following equation:
DKL(Xi||Xj) =
(µi − µj)2
2σ2i
+
1
2
(
σ2i
σ2j
− 1− ln σ
2
i
σ2j
)
(6.2)
where Xi ∼ N(µi, σi) and Xj ∼ N(µj, σj).
The experiment considers 100 different training sets without Indian
records, obtaining the relative acoustic models ~C = (C1, C2, . . . , C100). Then,
it has been built the reference learning set containing only Indian records,
and the relative acoustic model Cr. Then, it has been compared the dis-
tance between the output probability distributions of Cr with every Ci ∈ ~C,
obtaining the summed value of the divergence. Since the same phoneme
state has 25 possible output distributions, it is suffice compute the mean
distance value across all the distributions. Finally, just the five phonemes
with the highest divergence are considered and used to rebuiltMC.
Indian not Indian classified as
169 6 Indian
2 137 not Indian
Table 6.3: Speech recognition attack: the confusion matrix of the filtered
meta-classifier.
Table 6.3 shows the confusion matrix of the filtered classifier. The new
results are noticeably improved: the precision for the not Indian class is
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0.98 as before whereas the precision for the Indian class is increased to 0.95.
(Specifically: recall Indian: 0.986 and recall not Indian: 0.966.)
Also, the size of the decision tree has dropped down significantly: the
resulting decision tree is composed only of 21 nodes with 11 leaves.
6.3.2 Support Vector Machines
Background
Support Vector Machines (SVM) are supervised learning methods re-
lated to statistical learning theory and first introduced by Boser et al. in [11].
SVMs are largely used for classification and regression analysis. In their
basic form, SVMs are first trained with sets of input data classified in two
classes and are then used to guess the class for each new given input. This
aspect makes SVM a non-probabilistic binary linear classifier. Support Vector
classifiers are based on the concept of separating hyperplanes, that are the
hyperplanes in the attribute space that defines the decision boundaries
between sets of objects belonging to different classes.
During the training phase, the SVM receives a set of labeled examples,
each of them described by n numerical attributes (features) and thus repre-
sented as a set of points in a n-dimensional space. For the sake of simplic-
ity, the following example briefly introduces how an SVM works with data
represented by two attributes and mapped into two classes. The entry i of
the training dataset is represented by a 2-dimensional vector xi = 〈xi1, xi2〉
and belongs to one and only one class yi:
(y1, x1), (y2, x2), . . . (yn, xm)
yj ∈ −1, 1
(6.3)
Let suppose that the training data is linearly separable, namely there
exists a vector w and a scalar value b such that:
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w · xi + b ≥ 1 if yi = 1,
or
w · xi + b ≤ 1 if yi = −1
(6.4)
In order to deal with sets that are not linearly separable, the training vec-
tors xi can be mapped into a higher dimensional space by the function φ,
the so called kernel function: many kernel functions have been proposed,
but the most used are linear K(xi, xj) = xTi xj, polynomial K(xi, xj) =
(γxTi xj + r)
d,γ ≥ 0, radial basis function, RBF, K(xi, xj) = exp(−γ‖xi −
xj‖2),γ ≥ 0 and sigmoid K(xi, xj) = tanh(γxTi xj + r). The Support Vec-
tor classifier finds the optimal hyperplanes that separate the training data
with a maximal margin in this higher dimensional space; formally it re-
solves the system of equations:
yi(w0 · x + b0) = 0 (6.5)
It must be pointed out that, thanks to the nature of the training algo-
rithm adopted by SVM, the solution of equation 6.5 can be obtained at a
reasonable computational cost regardless of the kernel function adopted.
Intuitively, a good separation is achieved by the hyperplane that has the
largest distance - or margin - between the nearest training data points of
different classes: these points are called the support vectors. Roughly speak-
ing, the larger the margin, the lower the generalization error of the classi-
fier.
It is easy to notice how the functional margin points determine the hyper-
plane of separation. This information is trivially featured by the attribute
values in the training sets. Furthermore, It is worth to highlight that SVM
can disclose more information when several classifiers trained with differ-
ent kernel functions are provided. Since a trained SVM is represented by
a set of weights and a subset of the training sample, it is not easy to ob-
tain useful information on the characteristics of the complete training set
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Figure 6.5: Support Vector Classifier: graphical interpretation and func-
tional margin for a 2 class separable dataset.
directly from the SVM representation.
SVMs generated a significant research activity which extends across
the limits of data mining area. Although SVMs were initially introduced
to solve pattern recognition problems in an efficient way, [17]), nowadays
they are suitable in several contexts. In fact, SVMs are used for intrusion
detection and anomaly detection [75, 66, 26], or as part of complex systems
for similar tasks [104, 103]. Other authors propose SVM-based systems for
privacy-critical tasks, such as cancer diagnostic [63, 35], text categoriza-
tion [70], or face recognition [62].
SVM for network traffic classification
As shown by the extensive literature on this topic [50, 49, 106, 2], net-
work traffic classification is commonly realized by means of Machine Learn-
ing algorithms, like K-Means, HMM, decision trees, and SVM.
In order to evaluate the information leakage of SVM classifiers, the ex-
periment set up a simple Network Traffic Classifier able to distinguish
between DNS and WEB traffic. In particular, it has been considered an
SVM classifier based on the SMO module (Sequential Minimal Optimiza-
tion [118]) of the Weka framework.
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The experiment uses a real netflow dataset, gathered by a national tier 2
Autonomous System (refer to section 2.5 for more details).
The classifier was trained using a balanced set of netflows of WEB and
DNS traffic. It is worth noting that the WEB data set includes several traffic
patterns. Namely, it contains the flows directed to national newspapers,
advertising websites, and the Google search engine website.
During the training phase of the experiment, they have been used all
the fields of the netflow entries, except the source and destination IP ad-
dresses of the tracked connections. In the literature there are examples
of SVM Classifiers for traffic detection [50] able to distinguish a greater
variety of network protocols; the methodology used in the experiment is
similar, and can be considered appropriate to highlight the information
leakage issues that are the target of this dissertation.
Furthermore, note that the classifier performs good results with high
accuracy and precision: indeed, WEB and DNS connections have well-sep-
arated traffic patterns, producing well-spaced support vectors.
Attack description
The experiment investigates whether it is possible to extrapolate the
type of traffic used during the construction of the SVM model. For exam-
ple: Can we infer whether Google web traffic was used in the training samples?
The attack proceeds by creating several ad-hoc data sets with well-
defined statistical properties and use them to build the meta-classifierMC.
Namely, it has been created 70 ad-hoc data sets, selecting 20.000 flows of
network traffic, distinct from the original training set.
While all 70 classifiers were trained with a non-specific DNS traffic,
the first half of the classifiers were trained using WEB traffic directed only
to Google search engine (property P). For the remaining 35 classifiers, it
has been used WEB traffic without any netflow directed to Google search
engine (property P).
Each classifier was trained using a polynomial kernel function of degree
3 and was encoded by the list of the support vectors it contains, namely
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a set of points (y,~x) in the n−dimensional space (~x = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}).
The training samples of the classifierMC are composed of all the support
vectors of the 70 classifiers, labeled according to the property P or P used
for training:
DC =
⋃
Ci
{(y, 〈x〉, label)}
The experiment evaluates the performance of MC using the cross val-
idation strategy, a method that divides the data into k mutually exclusive
subsets (namely, the “folds”) of approximately equal size. With the cross
validation, the accuracy estimated is the average accuracy for the k folds.
Google not Google classified as
2312 101 Google
92 2786 not Google
Table 6.4: Internet traffic classifier attack: the confusion matrix of the meta-
classifier.
Table 6.4 summarizes the experiment results: with respect to the Google
class, results present a precision of 0.954 and a recall of 0.932. On the other
hand, it correctly classify not Google instances with a precision of 0.943 and
a recall of 0.962.
As in the example with the HMMs, the experimental results show that
we were able to build an effective meta-classifier that infers whether the
training set given as input includes also a specific type of traffic.
6.4 Differential Privacy
This section shows that Differential Privacy [44] is ineffective against
the attack strategy presented in this chapter. More specifically, the infor-
mation leakage presented with the previous experiments, sits outside the
adversary model considered by differential privacy.
Differential privacy, [44, 1, 9], protects against unintentional disclosure
of potentially sensitive information related to a single record of a database
D. In other words, differential privacy maximizes the accuracy of queries
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from statistical databases and, at the same time, minimizes the ability to
identify single records. To protect the privacy of database records, differ-
ential privacy opts for basically three approaches:
1. The first is to obfuscate the original database D and transform it into
D′. This strategy is completely ineffective in the model assumed,
since D′ is the database actually used during training and it is ex-
actly what the adversary in the defined model is after. That is, the
adversary is not interested in D, or any of its records, but it is rather
eager for any information on D′, i.e., anything that is the result of the
transformations applied by differential privacy.
2. Another approach is to train a classifier and then add noise to the
output. This is also ineffective since, in this model, the adversary has
complete access to the classifier and could just disable the instruction
that adds noise.
3. The third approach is more subtle. It consists of adding noise during
training, thus effectively obfuscating the learning process. This ap-
proach is still ineffective against the adversary since, intuitively, the
final classifier must anyway converge to classify correctly the train-
ing set. Thus, the noise must be somehow restrained and its effect
can easily be mitigated (see below).
It may be unclear why the third approach above fails to provide any
protection against the adversary. Hence, the following experiments show
how to extract sensitive information from a classifier trained within the
framework SulQ introduced in [9]. The SulQ authors improved several
standard classifiers to provide differential privacy. The main idea consists
of adding a small amount of noise, according to a Normal Distribution
N(0, σ), to any access to the training set. The variance of N regulates the
privacy property provided by differential privacy.
The experiments against the differential privacy use the K-Means algo-
rithm, which is the most popular clustering algorithm briefly introduced
in section 6.4.1.
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6.4.1 K-Means
Clustering is the task of partitioning unstructured data in such a way
that objects with an high level of similarity fall into the same partition.
Clustering is a typical example of unsupervised learning models where
examples are unlabeled, i.e., they are not pre-classified. The K-Means al-
gorithm, [96], is one of the most common methods in this family and it
has been used in many applications, e.g.: [99, 152, 48, 7]. For example,
in [99] the authors developed a real-time traffic classification method, ba-
sed on K-Means, to identify SSH flows from statistical behavior of IP traffic
parameters, such as length, arrival times and direction of packets.
In K-Means both training and classification phases are very intuitive.
During the learning process, the algorithm partitions a set of n obser-
vations into k clusters. Then, the algorithm selects the centroid (i.e., the
barycenter, or geometric midpoint) of every cluster as a representative for
that set of objects. More formally, given a set of observations (x1, x2, . . . , xn),
where each observation is a d-dimensional real vector, K-Means partitions
the n observations into k sets (k ≤ n) S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk} in order to min-
imize the within-cluster function:
argmin
S
k
∑
i=1
∑
xj∈Si
‖xj − µi‖ (6.6)
where µi is the mean of points in Si.
To classify a given data set of d-dimensional elements with respect to k
clusters, K-Means runs a learning process that can be summarized by the
following steps:
1. Randomly pick k initial cluster centroids;
2. Assign each instance x to the cluster that has a centroid nearest to x;
3. Recompute each cluster’s centroid based on which elements are con-
tained in it;
4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 until convergence is achieved.
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6.4.2 Hacking models secured by Differential Privacy
In order to hack the models secured by differential privacy two net-
work traffic classifier based on K-Means have been implemented. Both
classifiers have been trained with the same data set of the SVM experi-
ment (section 6.3.2). The first classifier directly uses the Euclidean distance
as metric to revise the centroids in the iterative refinement phase (equa-
tion 6.6). The second classifier implements a privacy preserving version of
K-Means, providing differential privacy (the implementation is consistent
with the definition provided within the SulQ framework, [9]). The version
of K-Means presented in SulQ modifies the update rule of the centroids.
In particular it defines a metric that uses approximated values of any sum
and any count of points in the training set1.
The experiment uses 70 training sets for both classifiers and it gets 70
distinct centroids. Recall that the objective of these experiments is to re-
cognize whether there was Google traffic within the traces.
Figure 6.6(a) shows the centroids of the K-Means model obtained us-
ing a Classifiers that does not implements differential privacy and that
includes web traffic directed to Google.com. Figure 6.6(b) represents the
model obtained with the same classifier trained without traffic directed to
Google.com. It is easy to see that the positions of the centroids are quite
different, in fact, it’s easy to distinguish between these two cases.
Figures 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) plot the centroids of the classifier which uses
differential privacy. Even in this case, an adversary can easily distinguish
whether there is Google.com traffic or not.
1As the original K-Means, the update rule is iterated until some convergence criterion
has been reached, or a fixed number of iterations have been applied.
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Figure 6.6: K-Means: Centroids of the Internet Traffic Classifier without
Differential Privacy.
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Figure 6.7: K-Means: Centroids of the Internet Traffic Classifier with Dif-
ferential Privacy.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This dissertation contributes to the research related to the Internet cy-
ber security and dealing with several issues in this domain.
First, this dissertation focuses on the security issues of the Border Gate-
way Protocol, BGP, which is responsible of the control plane. The security
of Internet Routing Protocol BGP has become one of the main interests of
Internet community. In this dissertation, chapter 3 describes an efficient
and secure version of BGP, reBGP, that avoids the use of Public Key In-
frastructures, relieving each AS nodes of the introduced overheads. The
fundamentals of reBGP are the Identity Based Aggregate Signatures to get
rid of public key distribution and the use of timestamps to enforce pre-
fix and route revocations. Section 3.4 evaluates the overheads introduced
in real case scenarios, and shows that the proposal outperforms S-BGP,
namely the well known secure version of BGP. Protocol reBGP does not
require any PKI, requires less volatile memory, introduces smaller compu-
tational complexity and brings out a smaller delay compared to S-BGP.
Next directions of this research include the evaluations of improvements
(e.g., the reduction of the memory occupancy) and the design and imple-
mentation of more features, like AS number revocations. In fact, the revo-
cations of the Internet resources are a critical aspect of BGP. Usually, tradi-
tional revocation means are based on Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL).
In CRL-based revocation systems, a revocation authority (most of the time
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the same authority that issues public key certificates) periodically updates
and broadcasts a list of revoked public keys. A public key is valid as long
as it does not appear in the latest list of revoked keys. Timely distribution
of the revocation lists is key to an effective revocation means. However,
CRL size and management do not fit the large scale of the Internet in-
frastructure. In particular, CRL suffers from message size and verification
overhead linear in the number of revoked public keys. These issues must
be redefined in the reBGP settings. Furthermore, the adoption of a new
routing protocol requires the analysis of the additional costs.
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of Denial of Service Detection, and shows
the effectiveness of several metrics based on Information Theory using a
real and representative dataset obtained within the research activities of
the ExTrABIRE project. The analysis were carried out using the CISCOTM
Netflows as data sources. In terms of Denial of Service Detection, one
of the most interesting challenges is the formal definition of a threshold
value, whose correctly distinguishes legitimate and malicious activities.
Additional future works are:
• based on real dataset, the analysis of metrics and strategies borrowed
by other academic fields, e.g. statistic or machine learning based
approaches;
• the analysis of metrics and strategies using obfuscated data sets, ac-
cording with the (k, j)-obfuscation technique.
It’s important to note that, using real data which include real attacks, it is
very hard to outline the ROC curve (Receiver Operating Characteristic, na-
mely the plots of the true positive rate against the false positive rate) that
well represents the effectiveness of the proposed strategy. This happens
simply because we don’t know the base truth for all the attack events.
Furthermore, this dissertation addresses the security and privacy con-
cerns of obfuscation of sensitive information in real dataset of network
flows. Chapter 5 formally models this issues, and proposes a novel de-
fense technique, the (k, j)-obfuscation. Differently from previous propos-
als, the (k, j)-obfuscation provides formal guarantees under realistic as-
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sumptions about the adversary’s knowledge. An extensive experimental
evaluation with a large set of real network flows shows that (k, j)-obfus-
cation also preserves the utility of network data. The (k, j)-obfuscation
technique opens sundry interesting future directions:
• many networking and security tasks can be re-thought based on ob-
fuscated datasets, for instance, quality of service (QoS), traffic classi-
fication, anomaly detection and more;
• the (k, j)-obfuscation technique can be extended in such a way that
the network flows owner releases the obfuscated datasets incremen-
tally;
• the (k, j)-obfuscation technique can be extended to different adver-
sary models; in particular, one in which the hosts fingerprint may
change over time.
Finally, this thesis introduces a novel approach to extract meaning-
ful information from machine learning classifiers, using a meta-classifier.
While previous works investigated privacy concerns of the single records
of databases, the attack strategy proposed in chapter 6 focuses on the sta-
tistical information correlated to the entire training set used during the
learning phase. Section 6.3 empirically shows that several ML classifiers
suffer from a new class of information leakage that is not captured by
privacy-preserving models, such as Privacy Preserving Data Mining or
Differential Privacy. In particular, the practical attacks showed success-
fully distinguish the accents of users involved in the corpus of a speech
recognition engine and also distinguish the traffic used during the creation
of a Internet traffic Classifier. Since this kind of leakage has been never
studied before, this outcome opens many future directions in terms of the-
oretical analysis and practical attacks. Theoretical directions are related to
the quantification of the leakages, formal definition of the attack and the
limits of such approach. On the opposite side, since the Machine Learn-
ing Algorithms pervade many Information Technology tasks, the strategy
proposed in this dissertation can treat other contexts.
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